THE TRAVAIL OF SLAVERY

By CHARLES GRIER SELLERS, JR.

The American experience knows no greater tragedy than the Old South's twistings and turnings on the rack of slavery. Others suffered more from the "peculiar institution," but only the suffering of white Southerners fits the classic formula for tragedy. Like no other Americans before or since, the white men of the ante-bellum South drove toward catastrophe by doing conscious violence to their truest selves. No picture of the Old South as a section confident and united in its dedication to a neo-feudal social order, and no explanation of the Civil War as a conflict between "two civilizations," can encompass the complexity and pathos of the ante-bellum reality. No analysis that misses the inner turmoil of the ante-bellum Southerner can do justice to the central tragedy of the southern experience.*

The key to the tragedy of southern history is the paradox of the slaveholding South's devotion to "liberty." Whenever and wherever Southerners sought to invoke their highest social values—in schoolboy declamations, histories, Fourth of July orations, toasts, or newspaper editorials—"liberty" was the incantation that sprang most frequently and most fervently from their lips and pens. "The

*My interpretation of the Old South draws heavily on the brilliant insights of Wilbur J. Cash in The Mind of the South (New York, 1941), and also on Clement Eaton's Freedom of Thought in the Old South (Durham, 1940).
love of liberty had taken deep root in the minds of Carolinians [sic] long before the revolution," explained South Carolina's historian David Ramsay in 1809. The "similarity of state and condition" produced by the early settlers' struggle to subdue the wilderness had "inculcated the equality of rights" and "taught them the rights of man."

The Revolutionary struggle made this implicit colonial liberalism explicit and tied it to patriotic pride in the new American Union. From this time on, for Southerners as for other Americans, liberty was the end for which the Union existed, while the Union was the instrument by which liberty was to be extended to all mankind. Thus the Fourth of July, the birthday of both liberty and Union, became the occasion for renewing the liberal idealism and the patriotic nationalism which united Americans of all sections at the highest levels of political conviction. "The Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution of the United States—Liberty and Union, now and forever, one and indissoluble," ran a Virginian's toast on July 4, 1850. The same sentiment and almost the same phrases might have been heard in any part of the South in any year of the ante-bellum period.

Now "liberty" can mean many things, but the Old South persistently used the word in the universalist sense of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. At Richmond in 1826 John Tyler eulogized Jefferson as "the devoted friend of man," who "had studied his rights in the great volume of nature, and saw with rapture the era near at hand, when those rights should be proclaimed, and the world aroused from the slumber of centuries." Jefferson's fame would not be confined to Americans, said Tyler, for his Declaration of Independence would be known wherever "man, so long the victim of oppression, awakes from the sleep of ages and bursts his chains." The conservative, slave-holding Tyler would soon be indicted by northern writers as a leader of the "slave power conspiracy" against human freedom;
yet in 1826 he welcomed the day "when the fires of liberty shall be kindled on every hill and shall blaze in every valley," to proclaim that "the mass of mankind have not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred to ride them. . . ." 33

Although a massive reaction against liberalism is supposed to have seized the southern mind in the following decades, the Nullifiers of the thirties and the radical southern sectionalists of the forties and fifties did not ignore or reject the Revolutionary tradition of liberty so much as they transformed it, substituting for the old emphasis on the natural rights of all men a new emphasis on the rights and autonomy of communities. It was ironic that these slaveholding defenders of liberty against the tyranny of northern domination had to place themselves in the tradition of '76 at all, and the irony was heightened by their failure to escape altogether its universalist implications. Even that fire-eater of fire-eaters, Robert Barnwell Rhett, declaimed on "liberty" so constantly and so indiscriminately that John Quincy Adams could call him "a compound of wild democracy and iron bound slavery." 44

Indeed the older nationalist-universalist conception of liberty remained very much alive in the South, and Southerners frequently used it to rebuke the radical sectionalists. Denouncing nullification in 1834, a Savannah newspaper vehemently declared that Georgians would never join in this assault on America's Revolutionary heritage. "No!" said the editor, "the light of the 4th of July will stream across their path, to remind them that liberty was not won in a day. . . ." Even a Calhounite could proudly assure an Independence Day audience in Virginia a few years later that American principles were destined "to work an entire revolution in the face of human affairs" and "to elevate the great mass of mankind." In North Carolina in the forties, citizens continued to toast "The Principles of the American Revolu-
tion—Destined to revolutionize the civilized world”; and editors rejoiced that the Fourth sent rays of light “far, far into the dark spots of oppressed distant lands.” In Charleston itself a leading newspaper proclaimed that Americans were “the peculiar people, chosen of the Lord, to keep the vestal flame of liberty, as a light unto the feet and a lamp unto the path of the benighted nations, who yet slumber or groan under the bondage of tyranny.”

Throughout the ante-bellum period the South's invocation of liberty was reinforced by its fervent devotion to the Union. “America shall reach a height beyond the ken of mortals,” exclaimed a Charleston orator in the 1820's; and through the following decades Southerners continued to exult with other Americans over their country's unique advantages and brilliant destiny. The Old South’s Americanism sometimes had a surprisingly modern ring, as when a conservative Georgia newspaper called on “True Patriots” to join the Whigs in defending the “American Way” against the “Red Republicanism” of the Democratic party. Even that bellwether of radical Southernism, De Bow's Review, printed article after article proclaiming the glorious destiny of the United States.

To the very eve of the Civil War the Fourth of July remained a widely observed festival of liberty and union in the South. By 1854, a hard-pressed orator was complaining that there was nothing fresh left to say: “The Stars and Stripes have been so vehemently flourished above admiring crowds of patriotic citizens that there is hardly a rhetorical shred left of them. . . . The very Union would almost be dissolved by eulogizing it at such a melting temperature.” The rising tide of sectional antagonism did somewhat dampen Independence Day enthusiasm in the late fifties, but even after the Civil War began, one southern editor saw “no reason why the birth of liberty should be permitted to pass unheeded wherever liberty has votaries. . . . The accursed
THE SOUTHERNER AS AMERICAN

Yankees are welcome to the exclusive use of their 'Doodle' but let the South hold on tenaciously to Washington's March and Washington's Principles and on every recurring anniversary of the promulgation of the Declaration, reassert the great principles of Liberty.97

What are we to make of these slaveholding champions of liberty? Was the ante-bellum Southerner history’s most hypocritical casuist? Or were these passionate apostrophes to the liberty of distant peoples a disguised protest against, or perhaps an escape from, the South’s daily betrayal of its liberal self? Southerners were at least subconsciously aware of the “detestable paradox” of “our every-day sentiments of liberty” while holding human beings in slavery, and many Southerners had made it painfully explicit in the early days of the republic.98

A Virginian was amazed that “a people who have declared ‘That all men are by nature equally free and independent’ and have made this declaration the first article in the foundation of their government, should in defiance of so sacred a truth, recognized by themselves in so solemn a manner, and on so important an occasion, tolerate a practice incompatible therewith.” Similarly, in neighboring Maryland, a leading politician expressed his astonishment that the people of the Old Free State “do not blush at the very name of Freedom.” Was not Maryland, asked William Pinkney, “at once the fair temple of freedom, and the abominable nursery of slaves; the school for patriots, and the foster-mother of petty despots; the asserter of human rights, and the patron of wanton oppression?” “It will not do,” he insisted, “thus to talk like philosophers, and act like unrelenting tyrants; to be perpetually sermonizing it with liberty for our text, and actual oppression for our commentary.”99

Still another leading Marylander pointed out that America’s Revolutionary struggle had been “grounded upon the preserva-
tion of those rights to which God and nature entitled us, not in particular, but in common with all the rest of mankind.” The retention of slavery, declared Luther Martin in 1788, was “a solemn mockery of, and insult to, that God whose protection we had then implored, and could not fail to hold us up to detestation, and render us contemptible to every true friend of liberty in the world.” During the Revolution, said Martin, “when our liberties were at stake, we warmly felt for the common rights of men.”

Martin did not exaggerate the inclusiveness of the liberal idealism that had accompanied the Revolutionary War in the southern states. Many of the Revolutionary county committees had denounced slavery, and Virginia’s Revolutionary convention of 1774 had declared its abolition to be “the greatest object of desire in those colonies where it was unhappily introduced in their infant state.” The implications of universalist liberalism for slavery were recognized most clearly, perhaps, by the Georgia county committee which resolved early in 1775 “to show the world that we are not influenced by any contracted motives, but a general philanthropy for all mankind, of whatever climate, language, or complexion,” by using its best endeavors to eliminate “the unnatural practice of slavery.”

It is well known that the South’s great statesmen of the Revolutionary generation almost unanimously condemned slavery as incompatible with the nation’s liberal principles. Though these elder statesmen proved incapable of solving the problem, Thomas Jefferson consoled himself with the thought that it could safely be left to the “young men, grown up, and growing up,” who “have sucked in the principles of liberty, as it were, with their mother’s milk.” Such young men did indeed grow up, and they kept most Southerners openly apologetic about slavery for fifty years following the Declaration of Independence.
When, in the mid-thirties, John C. Calhoun declared on the floor of the Senate that slavery was "a good—a great good," one of Jefferson's protégés and former law students was there to denounce "the obsolete and revolting theory of human rights and human society by which, of late, the institution of domestic slavery had been sustained and justified by some of its advocates in a portion of the South." Slavery was "a misfortune and an evil in all circumstances," said Virginia's Senator William C. Rives, and he would never "deny, as has been done by this new school, the natural freedom and equality of man; to contend that slavery is a positive good." He would never "attack the great principles which lie at the foundation of our political system," or "revert to the dogmas of Sir Robert Filmer, exploded a century and a half ago by the immortal works of Sidney and Locke."\(^{13}\)

Though open anti-slavery utterances grew infrequent after the 1830's, the generation which was to dominate southern life in the forties and fifties had already come to maturity with values absorbed from the afterglow of Revolutionary liberalism. On the eve of the Civil War De Bow's Review was to complain that during these earlier years, "when probably a majority of even our own people regarded the existence of slavery among us as a blot on our fair name . . . our youth [were allowed] to peruse, even in their tender years, works in which slavery was denounced as an unmitigated evil."\(^{14}\) Some of these youngsters had drawn some vigorous conclusions. "How contradictory" was slavery to every principle of "a republican Government where liberty is the boast and pride of its free citizens," exclaimed the son of a slaveholding family in South Carolina. Similarly a fifteen-year-old Tennessee

\(^{13}\) Almost as significant as Rives' own position is the fact that he touched Calhoun at a tender point when he associated him with the anti-libertarian Filmer. The South Carolinian "utterly denied that his doctrines had any thing to do with the tenets of Sir Robert Filmer, which he abhorred." "So far from holding with the dogmas of that writer, he had been the known and open advocate of freedom from the beginning," Calhoun was reported as saying. "Nor was there any thing in the doctrines he held in the slightest degree inconsistent with the highest and purest principles of freedom."
boy called slavery "a foul, a deadly blot . . . in a nation boasting of the republicanism of her principles" and owing allegiance to "the sacred rights of man."\textsuperscript{19}

A whole generation cannot transform its most fundamental values by a mere effort of will. Though Southerners tended during the latter part of the ante-bellum period to restrict their publicly voiced libertarian hopes to "oppressed distant lands," the old liberal misgivings about slavery did not die. Instead they burrowed beneath the surface of the southern mind, where they kept gnawing away the shaky foundations on which Southerners sought to rebuild their morale and self-confidence as a slave-holding people.

Occasionally the doubts were exposed, as in 1857, when Congressman L. D. Evans of Texas lashed out at the general repudiation of liberalism to which some defenders of slavery had been driven. The doctrine of human inequality and subordination might do for the dark ages of tyranny, he declared, "but emanating from the lips of a Virginia professor, or a statesman of Carolina, it startles the ear, and shocks the moral sense of a republican patriot." But Evans only illustrated the hopelessness of the southern dilemma by his tortured argument for transforming slavery into a kind of serfdom which would somehow preserve the slave's "natural equality," while gradually evolving into a state of "perfect equality."\textsuperscript{16}

The same year a Charleston magazine admitted that "We are perpetually aiming to square the maxims of an impracticable philosophy with the practice which nature and circumstances force upon us." Yet on the very eve of war, few Southerners were ready to resolve the dilemma by agreeing with the writer that "the [liberal] philosophy of the North is a dead letter to us."\textsuperscript{17}

If the Southerner had been embarrassed by his devotion to liberty and Union alone, he would have had less trouble easing
his mind on the subject of slavery. But as a Virginia legislator exclaimed in 1832, "This, sir, is a Christian community." Southerners "read in their Bibles, 'Do unto all men as you would have them do unto you'; and this golden rule and slavery are hard to reconcile." During those early decades of the nineteenth century, when the South was confessing the evils of slavery, it had been swept by a wave of evangelical orthodoxy. Though the wave crested about the time some Southerners, including some clergymen, began speaking of slavery as a positive good, it does not follow that the evangelical reaction against the eighteenth century's religious ideas contributed significantly to the reaction against the eighteenth century's liberalism with regard to slavery.

On the contrary, the evangelical denominations had strong anti-slavery tendencies. Methodists, Quakers, and Baptists nurtured an extensive abolitionist movement in the upper South during the twenties, when the rest of the country was largely indifferent to the slavery question; and the Presbyterians were still denouncing slavery in Kentucky a decade later. It would be closer to the truth to suggest that as Southerners wrestled with their consciences over slavery, they may have gained a first-hand experience with the concepts of sin and evil that made them peculiarly susceptible to Christian orthodoxy. At any rate, as late as 1849, a pro-slavery professor at the University of Alabama complained to Calhoun that no one had yet published a satisfactory defense of slavery in the light of New Testament teachings. The "many religious people at the South who have strong misgivings on this head," he warned, constituted a greater threat to the peculiar institution than the northern abolitionists.¹⁰

Even the irreligious found it hard to resist the claims of simple humanity or to deny that slaves, as one Southerner put it, "have hearts and feelings like other men." And those who were proof against the appeals to Revolutionary liberalism, Christianity, and humanity, still faced the arguments of Southerners in each suc-
ceeding generation that slavery was disastrous to the whites. Jefferson's famous lament that the slaveholder's child, "nursed, educated, and daily exercised in tyranny . . . must be a prodigy who can retain his manners and morals undepraved," was frequently echoed. George Mason's lament that slavery discouraged manufactures, caused the poor to despise labor, and prevented economic development, found many seconders in Virginia's slavery debate of 1831-32 and received elaborate statistical support from Hinton Rowan Helper in the fifties. The seldom mentioned but apparently widespread practice of miscegenation was an especially heavy cross for the women of the South. "Under slavery we live surrounded by prostitutes," wrote one woman bitterly. "... Any lady is ready to tell you who is the father of all the mulatto children in everybody's household but her own . . . My disgust sometimes is boiling over." 20

It is essential to understand that the public declarations of Southerners never revealed the full impact of all these anti-slavery influences on the southern mind. Fear of provoking slave insurrections had restrained free discussion of slavery even in the Revolutionary South, and an uneasy society exerted steadily mounting pressure against anti-slavery utterances thereafter. Only when Nat Turner's bloody uprising of 1831 shocked Southerners into open debate over the peculiar institution did the curtain of restraint part sufficiently to reveal the intensity of their misgivings. Thomas Ritchie's influential Richmond Enquirer caught the mood of that historic moment when it quoted a South Carolinian as exclaiming, "We may shut our eyes and avert our faces, if we please, but there it is, the dark and growing evil at our doors; and meet the question we must, at no distant day . . . What is to be done? Oh! my God, I do not know, but something must be done." 21

Many were ready to say what had to be done, especially a brilliant galaxy of the liberty-loving young Virginians on whom the
dying Jefferson had pinned his hopes. "I will not rest until slavery is abolished in Virginia," vowed Governor John Floyd; and during the winter of 1831-32 a deeply earnest Virginia legislature was wrapped in the Old South's only free and full debate over slavery. Not a voice was raised to justify human servitude in the abstract, while a score of Virginians attacked the peculiar institution with arguments made deadly by the South's endemic liberalism and Christianity. Two years later a Tennessee constitutional convention showed a tender conscience on slavery by admitting that "to prove it to be an evil is an easy task." Yet in both states proposals for gradual emancipation were defeated.22

The outcome was no surprise to the editor of the Nashville Republican. Few would question the moral evil of slavery, he had written back in 1825, "but then the assent to a proposition is not always followed by acting in uniformity to its spirit." Too many Southerners believed, perhaps from "the exercise of an interested casuistry," that nature had ordained the Negro to slavery by giving him a peculiar capacity for labor under the southern sun. Furthermore, southern white men would have to "be convinced that to labor personally is a more agreeable, and desirable occupation, than to command, & superintend the labor of others." Consequently, "as long as slavery is conceived to advance the pecuniary interests of individuals, they will be slow to relish, and reluctant to encourage, any plan for its abolition. They will quiet their consciences with the reflection that it was entailed upon us—that it has grown up with the institutions of the country—and that the establishment of a new order of things would be attended with great difficulty, and might be perilous."23

Thus when Nat Turner frightened Southerners into facing squarely the tragic ambiguity of their society, they found the price for resolving it too high. The individual planter's economic stake in slavery was a stubborn and perhaps insurmountable obstacle to change; and even Jefferson's nerve had failed at the task of re-
constituting the South’s social system to assimilate a host of Negro freedmen.

The whole South sensed that a fateful choice had been made. Slowly and reluctantly Southerners faced the fact that, if slavery were to be retained, things could not go on as before. The slaves were restive, a powerful anti-slavery sentiment was sweeping the western world, and southern minds were not yet nerved for a severe struggle in defense of the peculiar institution to which they were now committed. The South could no longer base its conscience with hopes for the eventual disappearance of slavery, or tolerate such hopes in any of its people. “It is not enough for them to believe that slavery has been entailed upon us by our forefathers,” proclaimed Calhoun’s national newspaper organ. “We must satisfy the consciences, we must allay the fears of our own people. We must satisfy them that slavery is of itself right—that it is not a sin against God—that it is not an evil, moral or political. . . . In this way, and this way only, can we prepare our own people to defend their institutions.” So southern leaders of the Calhoun school began trying to convince themselves and others that slavery was a “positive good,” while southern legislatures abridged freedom of speech and press, made manumission difficult or impossible, and imposed tighter restrictions on both slaves and free Negroes. The Great Reaction was under way.

Yet the Great Reaction, for all its formidable façade and terrible consequences, was a fraud. Slavery simply could not be blended with liberalism and Christianity, while liberalism and Christianity were too deeply rooted in the southern mind to be torn up overnight. Forced to smother and distort their most fundamental convictions by the decision to maintain slavery, and goaded by criticism based on these same convictions, Southerners of the generation before the Civil War suffered the most painful
loss of social morale and identity that any large group of Americans has ever experienced.

The surface unanimity enforced on the South in the forties and fifties by the Great Reaction concealed a persistent hostility to slavery. It is true that large numbers of the most deeply committed anti-slavery men left the South. They were usually men of strong religious conviction, such as Levi Coffin, the North Carolina Quaker who moved to Indiana to become the chief traffic manager of the Underground Railroad, or Will Breckinridge, the Kentucky Presbyterian who declared, “I care little where I go—so that I may only get where every man I see is as free as myself.” In fact the national banner of political anti-slavery was carried in the forties by a former Alabama slaveholder, James G. Birney, who had rejected slavery for the same reasons that bothered many other Southerners—because it was “inconsistent with the Great Truth that all men are created equal, . . . as well as the great rule of benevolence delivered to us by the Savior Himself that in all things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you do ye even so to them.”

Many zealous anti-slavery men remained in the South, however, to raise their voices wherever the Great Reaction relaxed its grip. If this almost never happened in the lower South, a dissenter in western Virginia could exult in 1848 that “anti-slavery papers and anti-slavery orators are scattering far and wide the seeds of freedom, and an immense number of persons are uttering vaticinations in contemplation of a day of emancipation”; while the reckless courage of Cassius Clay and his allies kept the anti-slavery cause alive in Kentucky. “The contention of planter politicians that the South had achieved social and political unity,” concludes the ablest student of the peculiar institution, “appears, then, to have been the sheerest of wishful thinking.”

Far more significant than outright anti-slavery opinion was the persistent disquietude over slavery among the many white
The Travail of Slavery

Southerners who found the new pro-slavery dogmas hard to swallow. The official southern view held that slaveholders “never inquire into the propriety of the matter, . . . they see their neighbors buying slaves, and they buy them . . . leaving to others to discuss the right and justice of the thing.” In moments of unusual candor, however, the pro-slavery propagandists admitted the prevalence of misgivings. Calhoun’s chief editorial spokesman thought, the principal danger of northern abolitionism was its influence upon “the consciences and fears of the slave-holders themselves.” Through “the insinuation of their dangerous heresies into our schools, our pulpits, and our domestic circles,” Duff Green warned, the abolitionists might succeed in “alarming the consciences of the weak and feeble, and diffusing among our own people a morbid sensitivity on the question of slavery.”

Slavery’s apologists were particularly irritated by the numerous instances “in which the superstitious weakness of dying men . . . induces them, in their last moments, to emancipate their slaves.” Every manumission was an assault on the peculiar institution and a testimony to the tenacity with which older values resisted the pro-slavery dogmas. “Let our women and old men, and persons of weak and infirm minds, be disabused of the false . . . notion that slavery is sinful, and that they will peril their souls if they do not disinherit their offspring by emancipating their slaves!” complained a Charleston editor in the fifties. It was high time masters “put aside all care or thought what Northern people say about them.”

Yet the manumissions went on, despite mounting legal obstacles. The census reported more than 3,000 for 1860, or one manumission for every 1,309 slaves, which was double the number reported ten years before. If this figure seems small, it should be remembered that these manumissions were accomplished against “almost insuperable obstacles”—not only southern laws prohibiting manumission or making it extremely difficult, but also
northern laws barring freed Negroes. The evidence indicates that there would have been many more munishments if the laws had been more lenient, and if masters had not feared that the freed Negroes would be victimized.  

The explanations advanced by men freeing their slaves illustrate the disturbing influence of liberalism and Christianity in the minds of many slaveholders. A Virginia will affirmed the testator's belief "that slavery in all its forms . . . is inconsistent with republican principles, that it is a violation of our bill of rights, which declares, \textit{that all men are by nature equally free}; and above all, that it is repugnant to the spirit of the gospel, which enjoins universal love and benevolence." A North Carolinian listed four reasons for freeing his slaves: (1) "Agreeably to the rights of man, every human being, be his colour what it may, is entitled to freedom"; (2) "My conscience, the great criterion, condemns me for keeping them in slavery"; (3) "The golden rule directs us to do unto every human creature, as we would wish to be done unto"; and (4) "I wish to die with a clear conscience, that I may not be ashamed to appear before my master in a future World." In Tennessee, one man freed his slave woman because he wanted her to "Enjoy Liberty the birthright of all Mankind." Another not only believed "it to be the duty of a Christian to deal with his fellow man in a state of bondage with humanity and kindness," but also feared that his own "happiness hereafter" depended on the disposition he made of his slaves. Still another, after ordering two slaves freed, hoped that "no one will offer to undo what my conscience tole me was my duty," and that "my children will consider it so and follow the fusteps of their father and keep now [no] slaves longer than they pay for their raising and expenses."  

But conscience was a problem for many more Southerners than those who actually freed their slaves, as the pro-slavery philosophers were compelled to recognize. "I am perfectly aware that slavery is repugnant to the \textit{natural} emotions of men," confessed
William J. Grayson on the eve of the Civil War. James H. Hammond was one of many who sought to quiet the troublesome southern conscience by picturing slavery as an eleemosynary institution, maintained at considerable cost by generous slaveholders. Southerners must content themselves, said Hammond, with “the consoling reflection, that what is lost to us is gained to humanity.” Grayson, on the other hand, despaired of quieting conscience and concluded grimly that conscience itself must be discredited. “I take the stand on the position that our natural feelings are unsafe guides for us to follow in the social relations.”

But a host of Southerners, perhaps including Grayson and Hammond, could neither satisfy nor ignore their consciences. One troubled master confided to his wife, “I sometimes think my feelings unfit me for a slaveholder.” A North Carolina planter told his son that he could not discipline his slaves properly, believing that slavery was a violation of “the natural rights of a being who is as much entitled to the enjoyment of liberty as myself.” In the rich Mississippi Delta country, where many of the largest slaveholders remained loyal to the Union in 1861, one man had long sought “some means ... to rid us of slavery, because I never had any great fondness for the institution although I had been the owner of slaves from my youth up.” Another Mississippi slaveholder was “always an abolitionist at heart,” but “did not know how to set them free without wretchedness to them, and utter ruin to myself.” Still another “owned slaves & concluded if I was merciful & humane to them I might just as well own them as other Persons ... [but] I had an instinctive horror of the institution.” How many masters held such opinions privately can never be known, but observers at the close of the Civil War noted a surprisingly general feeling of relief over the destruction of slavery. An upcountry South Carolinian certainly spoke for many Southerners when he said, “I am glad the thing is done away with; it was more plague than pleasure, more loss than profit.”
The nub of the Southerner's ambivalent attitude toward slavery was his inability to regard the slave consistently as either person or property. Slaves "were a species of property that differed from all others," James K. Polk declared as a freshman congressman; "they were rational; they were human beings. The slave's indeterminate status was writ large in the ambiguity of the whole structure of southern society. A sociologist has analyzed the institutional features of slavery as lying along a "rationality-traditionalism" range," whose polar points were mutually contradictory. At one pole lay the economic view. Since slavery was a labor system employed in a highly competitive market economy, a minimum of rational efficiency was necessarily prescribed for economic survival. This called for a "sheerly economic" view of slavery, one which regarded the slave as property, which gave the master unlimited control over the slave's person, which evaluated the treatment of slaves wholly in terms of economic efficiency, which structured the slave's situation so that his self-interest in escaping the lash became his sole motivation to obedience, which sanctioned the domestic slave trade and demanded resumption of the foreign slave trade as essential mechanisms for supplying and redistributing labor, and which dismissed moral considerations as both destructive of the labor supply and irrelevant. Though the plantation system tended during the latter part of the slavery period to approach the ideal type of a purely commercial economic organization, especially with the geographical shift to the new lands of the Southwest, few if any Southerners ever fully accepted this "sheerly economic" view of slavery.

At the other pole lay a "traditional" or "familial" view, which regarded the slave more as person than property and idealized "the patriarchal organization of plantation life and the maintenance of the family estate and family slaves at all costs." Both the "sheerly economic" and the "familial" views of slavery were sanctioned by southern society; economics and logic drove South-
The Travail of Slavery

erners toward the former, while sentiment, liberalism, and Christianity dragged them in the other direction.\textsuperscript{34}

This fundamental ambivalence was most clearly apparent in the law of slavery. Early colonial law had justified the enslavement of Negroes on the ground that they were heathens, so that the conversion of slaves to Christianity raised a serious problem. Though the Negro was continued in bondage, the older conviction that conversion and slave status were incompatible died hard, as was demonstrated by the successive enactments required to establish the new legal definition of slavery on the basis of the Negro's race rather than his heathenism. Even then problems remained. Not all Negroes were slaves, and the South could never bring itself to reduce free Negroes to bondage. Moreover, the slave's admission to the privilege of salvation inevitably identified him as a person. But slavery could not be viewed as a legal relationship between legal persons; in strict logic it had to be a chattel arrangement that left the slave no legal personality.

Was the slave a person or merely property in the eyes of the law? This question southern legislatures and courts never settled. He could not legally marry, own property, sue or be sued, testify, or make contracts; yet he was legally responsible for crimes he committed, and others were responsible for crimes committed against him. The ambiguity was most striking in the case of a slave guilty of murder; as a person he was responsible and could be executed; but he was also property, and if the state took his life, his owner had to be compensated. “The slave is put on trial as a human being,” declared a harrassed court in one such case. “Is it not inconsistent, in the progress of the trial, to treat him as property, like . . . a horse, in the value of which the owner has a pecuniary interest which makes him incompetent as a witness?”\textsuperscript{35}

The Southerner's resistance to the legal logic of making slavery a simple property arrangement is amply illustrated in court decisions. “A slave is not in the condition of a horse,” said a Ten-
nessic judge. "He has mental capacities, and an immortal principle in his nature." The laws did not "extinguish his high-born nature nor deprive him of many rights which are inherent in men." Similarly a Mississippi court declared that it would be "a stigma upon the character of the State" if a slave could be murdered "without subjecting the offender to the highest penalty known to the criminal jurisprudence of the country. Has the slave no rights, because he is deprived of his freedom? He is still a human being, and possesses all those rights of which he is not deprived by the positive provision of the law."36

The anguish induced by the legal logic of slavery was expressed most clearly in a North Carolina decision. Recognizing the objectives of slavery to be "the profit of the master, his security and the public safety," and recognizing the slave to be "doomed in his own person, and his posterity, to live without knowledge, and without the capacity to make any thing his own, and to toil that another may reap the fruits," the court concluded that, "Such services can only be expected from one . . . who surrenders his will in implicit obedience to that of another. . . . The power of the master must be absolute." The judge felt "as deeply as any man can" the harshness of this proposition. "As a principle of moral rights, every person in his retirement must repudiate it. . . . It constitutes the curse of slavery to both the bond and the free portions of our population. But it is inherent in the relation of masters and slaves."37

The slave's indeterminate status was not just a legal problem, but a daily personal problem for every master. "It is difficult to handle simply as property, a creature possessing human passions and human feelings," observed Frederick Law Olmsted, "while, on the other hand, the absolute necessity of dealing with property as a thing, greatly embarrasses a man in any attempt to treat it as a person." Absentee owners and the masters of large, commercially rationalized plantations might regard their field hands as economic
units, but few of them could avoid personalizing their relationships with house servants in a way that undercut the sheerly economic conception of the peculiar institution. The majority of slaveholders, moreover, were farmers who lived and worked closely with their slaves, and such masters, according to D. R. Hundley, "seem to exercise but few of the rights of ownership over their human chattels, making so little distinction between master and man, that their Negroes [are] . . . in all things treated more like equals than slaves."38

The personalized master-slave relationship was a direct threat to the peculiar institution, for slavery's stability as an economic institution depended upon the Negro's acceptance of the caste line between himself and the white man. Sociologists tell us that such caste systems as India's were stabilized by the fact that "those goals and value-attitudes which were legitimate for the dominant caste had no implications concerning their legitimacy for the subordinate caste." In the South, however, where the values of the dominant caste produced personalized master-slave relationships, and where Negroes could view manumission as the crucial product of personalization, members of the subordinate caste learned to regard the value system and goals of the dominant caste as at least partly valid for themselves. The presence of free Negroes in southern society meant that the caste line did not coincide completely with the color line, and the overlap made liberty a legitimate goal even for the slave. Thus the slave's passion for freedom, manifested in countless escapes and insurrection plots, was not "lit up in his soul by the hand of Deity," as a Virginia legislator thought, but was implanted by the white man's own inability to draw the caste line rigidly.39

Though Southerners could guard against the dangers of personalization in the abstract, as when legislatures prohibited manumission, the individual master, face to face with his human property, found it harder to behave in accordance with the sheerly
economic view of slavery. Economic efficiency demanded "the painful exercise of undue and tyrannical authority," observed a North Carolina planter; and the famous ex-slave Frederick Douglass testified that kind treatment increased rather than diminished the slave's desire for freedom. Consequently humanity and the profit motive were forever struggling against each other in the master's mind. While the profit motive frequently won out, humanity had its victories too. "I would be content with much less ... cotton if less cruelty was exercised," said a disturbed planter in Mississippi. "I fear I am near an abolition[jst]." Most often, perhaps, the master's humanitarian and economic impulses fought to a draw, leaving him continually troubled and frustrated in the management of his slaves. Slaveholding, concluded one master, subjected "the man of care and feeling to more dilemmas than any other vocation he could follow."40

Certainly southern opinion condemned thoroughgoing economic rationality in the treatment of slaves. This was most apparent in the low social status accorded to slave traders and overseers, when by normal southern canons of prestige their intimate relation with the peculiar institution and their control over large numbers of slaves should have given them a relatively high rank. Both groups were absolutely essential to the slavery system, and both bore a purely economic relation to it. The overseer, who was judged primarily by the profits he wrung out of slave labor, typified the sheerly exploitative aspects of slavery; while the slave trader, who presided over the forcible disruption of families and the distribution of slaves as marketable commodities, was the most conspicuous affront to the familial conception of the peculiar institution. These men certainly developed a cynical attitude toward the human property they controlled, but they did not uniformly exhibit the dishonesty, greed, vulgarity, and general immorality that southern opinion ascribed to them. By thus stereotyping these exemplars of the sheerly economic aspects of slavery, southern
society created scapegoats on whom it could discharge the guilt feelings arising from the necessity of treating human beings as property.\textsuperscript{41}

These guilt feelings seem to have increased during the final years of the ante-bellum period, as slavery approximated the sheerly economic pattern on more and more plantations. Never had Southerners regaled themselves and others so insistently with the myth of the happy slave. A European traveler met few slaveholders who could "openly and honestly look the thing in the face. They wind and turn about in all sorts of ways, and make use of every argument . . . to convince me that the slaves are the happiest people in the world, and do not wish to be placed in any other condition." At the same time there developed a strong movement to extend and implement the paternalistic-personalistic pattern. Some states amended their slave codes to prescribe minimum standards of treatment, and there was agitation for more fundamental reforms—legalization of slave marriages, protection against disruption of slave families, and encouragement of Negro education.\textsuperscript{42}

Especially significant was the crusade for religious instruction of slaves. "We feel that the souls of our slaves are a solemn trust, and we shall strive to present them faultless and complete before the presence of God," declared that high priest of southern Presbyterianism, Dr. James Henley Thornwell. The argument for religious instruction was also a justification for slavery, and the only one that effected any kind of real accommodation between the peculiar institution and the white Southerner's innate disposition to regard the slave as a human being. It was precisely for this reason that the religious interpretation of slavery quieted more southern qualms than any other facet of the pro-slavery argument. "However the world may judge us in connection with our institution of slavery," said Georgia's Bishop Stephen Elliott, "we conscientiously believe it to be a great missionary institution—one
arranged by God, as he arranges all the moral and religious influences of the world so that the good may be brought out of the seeming evil, and a blessing wrung out of every form of the curse.”

Yet the religious argument was ultimately subversive of slavery. By giving the slave’s status as person precedence over his status as property, and by taking as its mission the elevation of the slave as a human being, the movement for religious instruction necessarily called into question the inherent beneficence and permanence of the institution. Dr. Thornwell resolutely argued that slavery could end only in heaven, because only there could the sin that produced it end: meanwhile ‘the Christian’s duty was to mitigate its evils. Bishop Elliott, on the other hand, believed that by giving the slaves religious instruction “we are elevating them in every generation” here on earth, and he spoke for many another southern churchman when he conceded that this implied ultimately some change in the slaves’ worldly status. Thus, by the close of the slavery era, the religious defense of the institution was bringing the South back toward its old colonial doubts about the validity of continued bondage for converted men and women.43

Nowhere, in fact, was the South’s painful inner conflict over slavery more evident than in the elaborate body of theory by which it tried to prove (mainly to itself) the beneficence of its peculiar social system. “It has not been more than . . . thirty years since the abolition of slavery was seriously debated in the legislature of Virginia,” observed the Southern Literary Messenger on the eve of the Civil War. “Now, on the contrary . . . the whole Southern mind with an unparalleled unanimity regards the institution of slavery as righteous and just, ordained of God, and to be perpetuated by Man.” Yet the stridency with which southern unanimity was ceaselessly proclaimed stands in suggestive contrast to the private views of many Southerners. “To expect men to
agree that Slavery is a blessing, social, moral, and political," wrote a North Carolina Congressman to his wife, "when many of those who have all their lives been accustomed to it . . . believe exactly the reverse, is absurd." Even the fire-eaters confessed privately that outside South Carolina most slaveholders were "mere negro-drivers believing themselves wrong and only holding on to their negroes as something to make money out of." South Carolinians themselves had "retrograded," wrote Robert W. Barnwell in 1844, "and must soon fall into the same category."44

Close examination of the superficially impressive pro-slavery philosophy reveals, as Louis Hartz has brilliantly demonstrated, a "mass of agonies and contradictions in the dream world of southern thought." The peculiar institution could be squared theoretically with either the slave's humanity or democratic liberalism for whites, but not with both. Thus the necessity for justifying slavery, coupled with the white South's inability to escape its inherited liberalism or to deny the common humanity it shared with its Negro slaves, inspired "a mixture of pain and wild hyperbole."45

Recognizing that the religious argument by itself was a threat to the peculiar institution, one school of pro-slavery philosophers sought to preserve both slavery and the slave's humanity by sacrificing democratic liberalism and falling back to a neo-feudal insistence on the necessity of subordination and inequality in society. "Subordination rules supreme in heaven and must rule supreme on earth," asserted Bishop Elliott, and he did not attempt to disguise the repudiation of democratic liberalism that followed from this principle. Carried away by Revolutionary fervor, Southerners along with other Americans had "declared war against all authority and against all form"; they had pronounced all men equal and man capable of self-government. "Two greater falsehoods could not have been announced," Elliott insisted, "because the one struck at the whole constitution of civil society as
it had ever existed, and because the other denied the fall and corruption of man."45

George Fitzhugh, the most logical and impressive of the pro-slavery philosophers and the leading exponent of southern neo-feudalism, would have preserved the humanity of the Negroes but denied freedom to the white masses by making both subject to the same serf-like subordination. Only thus could men be saved from the frightful corruption and turbulence of "free society." But southern planters were too much bourgeois capitalists and southern farmers were too much Jacksonian democrats to entertain the neo-feudalists' vituperation at "free society." "Soon counties, neighborhoods, or even individuals will be setting up castles," commented a sarcastic Alabaman.47 Fitzhugh and his fellow intellectuals might talk all they pleased about reducing the masses, white and black, to serfdom, but practical politicians and publicists knew better than to fly so directly in the face of the South's liberal bias.

At the hands of men like James H. Hammond, therefore, neo-feudalism became a racial "mud-still" theory, which divided society along the color line, relegating Negroes to bondage and reserving democratic liberalism for white men only. In the late forties a school of southern ethnologists arose to declare the Negro a distinct and permanently inferior species; and by 1854 Mississippi's Senator Albert G. Brown could invite Northerners to his state "to see the specimen of that equality spoken of by Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence." Nowhere else in the Union, said Brown, was there such an exemplification of Jefferson's beautiful sentiment. "In the South all men are equal. I mean of course, white men; negroes are not men, within the meaning of the Declaration."45

The racist argument was attacked with surprising vehemence by both religionists and feudalists. At least one Southerner went far beyond most northern abolitionists in asserting that "the Afri-
can is endowed with faculties as lofty, with perceptions as quick, with sensibilities as acute, and with natures as susceptible of improvement, as we are, who boast a fairer skin.” Indeed, said this Virginian, if Negroes were “operated upon by the same ennobling impulses, stimulated by the same generous motives, and favored by the same adventitious circumstances, they would, as a mass, reach as high an elevation in the scale of moral refinement, and attain as great distinction on the broad theatre of intellectual achievement, as ourselves.”

While few Southerners would go as far as this, the religionists did maintain stoutly “that the African race is capable of considerable advance.” Religious instruction of slaves would have been pointless without some such assumption, but the churchmen objected more fundamentally to the racist argument because it robbed the slave of his essential humanity. The feudalist, too, rejected the idea of racial inferiority, with Fitzhugh arguing that “it encourages and incites brutal masters to treat negroes, not as weak, ignorant and dependent brethren, but as wicked beasts, without the pale of humanity.” The Negro was essential to the web of reciprocal duties and affections between superiors and subordinates that was supposed to knit the idyllic neo-feudal world together. “The Southerner is the negro’s friend, his only friend,” said Fitzhugh. “Let no intermeddling abolitionist, no refined philosophy dissolve this friendship.”

The debate between the religionists and feudals, on the one hand, and the racists, on the other, defined the Old South’s central dilemma. The first two championed personalism and the familial view of the peculiar institution. The religionists were willing to question the beneficence and permanence of slavery in order to assert the slave’s humanity; and the feudals were willing to surrender democratic liberalism in order to retain a personalized system of servitude. The racists, on the other hand, denied the slave’s full human status in order to reconcile slavery
with democratic liberalism for whites. The South's ingrained liberalism and Christianity, in short, were continually thwarting the logic-impelled effort to develop a fully rationalized, sheerly economic conception of slavery, warranted by the racist argument.

It was this inner conflict which produced the South's belligerent dogmatism in the recurrent crises of the fifties. The whole massive pro-slavery polemic had the unreal ring of logic pushed far beyond conviction. "I assure you, Sir," Fitzhugh confessed in a private letter, "I see great evils in Slavery, but in a controversial work I ought not to admit them." If the South's best minds resolutely quashed their doubts, it is small wonder that crisis-tossed editors and politicians took refuge in positive and extreme positions.

The final open collision between the two contradictory tendencies in the South's thinking about slavery came on the very eve of the Civil War, when some Southerners relentlessly pursued the logic of slavery's beneficence to the conclusion that the foreign slave trade should be reopened. "I would sweep from the statute-book every interference with slavery," shouted a fire-eating South Carolina congressman. "I would repeal the law declaring the slave trade piracy: I would withdraw our slave squadron from the coast of Africa; and I would leave slavery unintervened against, wherever the power of the country stretches."

Despite the lip service paid to the "positive good" doctrine, majority southern opinion was deeply shocked by its logical extension to sanction the foreign slave trade. Few Southerners were willing "to roll back the tide of civilization and christianity of the nineteenth century, and restore the barbarism of the dark ages," declared a Georgia newspaper, and churchmen denounced the proposal with special vehemence. Even one of its original advocates turned against it when he witnessed the suffering of the Negroes aboard a captured slave ship. This "practical, fair evidence of its effects has cured me forever," confessed D. H. Hamilton. "I wish that everyone in South Carolina, who is in favor of re-open-
The Travail of Slavery

ing of the Slave-trade, could have seen what I have been compelled to witness. . . . It seems to me that I can never forget it."55 This was the agony of the pro-slavery South under the shadow of Civil War.

How, then, did the fundamentally liberal, Christian, American South ever become an "aggressive slavocracy"? How did it bring itself to flaunt an aristocratic social philosophy? To break up the American Union? To wage war for the purpose of holding four million human beings in a bondage that violated their humanity? The answer is that Southerners did not and could not rationally and deliberately choose slavery and its fruits over the values it warped against. Rather it was the very conflict of values, rendered intolerable by constant criticism premised on values Southerners shared, which drove them to seek a violent resolution.

Social psychologists observe that such value conflicts—especially when they give rise to the kind of institutional instability revealed by the ambiguities of southern slavery—make a society "suggestible," or ready to follow the advocates of irrational and aggressive action.† Thus it was fateful that the Old South de-

† The viewpoint of the present essay is not to be confused with the interpretation of the Civil War in terms of a "slave power conspiracy." Chauncey S. Boucher has demonstrated convincingly that the South was incapable of the kind of concerted action necessary for conspiracy. "In Re That Aggressive Slavocracy," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, VIII (June-September, 1921), 13-79. He is less persuasive, however, in demonstrating the equal inappropriateness of the designation "aggressive slavocracy." Boucher does admit (p. 30) that many Southerners "took a stand which may perhaps best be termed 'aggressively defensive.'" This is not too far from the attitude of the present essay, especially in view of Boucher's tantalizing suggestion (p. 70) that when Southerners talked of slavery as a divinely ordained institution, they were in the position of "saying a thing and being conscious while saying it that the thing is not true . . . but a position forced upon them by necessity of circumstances for their own immediate protection."

† Hadley Cantril, The Psychology of Social Movements (New York, 1941), 61-64. The social sciences have much to contribute to southern historical scholarship; in fact, the essential key to understanding the Old South seems to lie in the area of social psychology. Though Harry Elmer Barnes asserted as much nearly forty years ago, scholarly efforts in this direction have hardly moved
veloped an unusually able minority of fire-eating sectionalists, who labored zealously, from the 1830's on, to unite the South behind radical measures in defense of slavery. Though a majority of Southerners remained profoundly distrustful of these extremists throughout the ante-bellum period, their unceasing agitation steadily aggravated the South's tensions and heightened its underlying suggestibility. By egging the South on to ever more extreme demands, the Calhouns, Rhett's, and Yanceys provoked violent northern reactions, which could then be used to whip the South's passions still higher. At length, in 1860, capitalizing on intrigues for the Democratic presidential nomination, the fire-eaters managed to split the Democratic party, thus insuring the election of a Republican President and paving the way for secession.

beyond the naive enthusiasm of Barnes' suggestion that "southern chivalry" was "a collective compensation for sexual looseness, racial intermixture, and the maltreatment of the Negro."—"Psychology and History: Some Reasons for Predicting Their More Active Cooperation in the Future," American Journal of Psychology, XXX (October, 1919), 374. A psychologist has interpreted southern behavior in terms of defense mechanism, rationalization, and projection.—D. A. Hartman, "The Psychological Point of View in History: Some Phases of the Slavery Struggle," Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology, XVII (October-December, 1922), 261-73. A psychoanalyst has traced the white South's treatment of the Negro to the general insecurities of Western man uprooted by industrialism, and to an unconscious sexual fascination with the Negro as "a symbol which gives a secret gratification to those who are inhibited and crippled in their instinctual satisfaction."—Helen V. McLean, "Psychodynamic Factors in Racial Relations," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCLIV (March, 1946), 159-66. And a sociologist has sought to explain the South in terms of a concept of "social neurosis."—Read Bain, "Man Is the Measure," Sociology: A Journal of Inter-Personal Relations, VI (November, 1943), 460-64.

These efforts, while suggestive, seem hardly more systematic and considerably less cautious than the historian's unsophisticated, commonsense way of trying to assess psychological factors. Yet Hadley Cantrill's Psychology of Social Movements has demonstrated that the infant discipline of social psychology can, even in its present primitive state, furnish the historian with extremely useful concepts. Historians of the Old South have special reason for pressing their problems on their brethren in social psychology, while the social psychologists may find in historical data a challenging area for developing and testing hypotheses. Especially rewarding to both historians and social scientists would be a collaborative study of ante-bellum southern radicalism and its peculiar locus, South Carolina.
Inflammatory agitation and revolutionary tactics succeeded only because Southerners had finally passed the point of rational self-control. The almost pathological violence of their reactions to northern criticism indicated that their misgivings about their moral position on slavery had become literally intolerable under the mounting abolitionist attack. "The South has been moved to resistance chiefly . . . by the popular dogma in the free states that slavery is a crime in the sight of GOD," said a New Orleans editor in the secession crisis. "The South, in the eyes of the North, is degraded and unworthy, because of the institution of servitude."\(^54\)

Superimposed on this fundamental moral anxiety was another potent emotion, fear. John Brown's raid in October, 1859, created the most intense terror of slave insurrection that the South had ever experienced; and in this atmosphere of dread the final crisis of 1860-61 occurred. The press warned that the South was "slumbering over a volcano, whose smoldering fires, may at any quiet starry midnight, blacken the social sky with the smoke of desolation and death." Southerners believed their land to be overrun by abolitionist emissaries, who were "tampering with our slaves, and furnishing them with arms and poisons to accomplish their hellish designs." Lynch law was proclaimed, and vigilance committees sprang up to deal with anyone suspected of abolitionist sentiments. A Mississippian reported the hanging of twenty-three such suspects in three weeks, while the British consul at Charleston described the situation as "a reign of terror."\(^55\)

Under these circumstances a large part of the southern white population approached the crisis of the Union in a state of near-hysteria. One man thought that "the minds of the people are aroused to a pitch of excitement probably unparalleled in the history of our country." "The desire of some for change," reported a despairing Virginian, "the greed of many for excitement, and the longing of more for anarchy and confusion, seems to have
unthroned the reason of men, and left them at the mercy of passion and madness."

Just as important as the hysteria which affected some Southerners was the paralysis of will, the despair, the sense of helplessness, which the excitement created in their more conservative fellows. Denying that the southern people really wanted to dissolve the Union, a Georgia editor saw them as being "dragged on, blindfolded, to the consummation of the horrid act." A "moral pestilence" had "swept over the South," said a prominent North Carolinian, "dethroning reason, & paralyzing the efforts of the best Union men of the country." But even some who decried the hysteria felt that "no community can exist & prosper when this sense of insecurity prevails," and concluded that almost any alternative was preferable to the strain of these recurrent crises. It was this conviction, more than anything else, which caused moderate men to give way to the bold and confident radicals.

From the circumstances of the secession elections—the small turnouts, the revolutionary tactics of the fire-eaters, the disproportionate weighting of the results in favor of plantation areas, the coercive conditions under which the upper South voted, and the hysteria that prevailed everywhere—it can hardly be said that a majority of the South's white people deliberately chose to dissolve the Union in 1861. A member of South Carolina's secession convention frankly admitted that "the common people" did not understand what was at stake. "But whoever waited for the common people when a great movement was to be made?" he asked. "We must make the move and force them to follow. That is the way of all revolutions and all great achievements."

The leaders made the move, and the people followed, but with what underlying misgivings the sequel only too plainly demonstrated. The first flush of enthusiasm was rapidly supplanted by an apathy and a growing disaffection which historians have identi-
The Travail of Slavery

fied as major factors in the Confederacy's failure. During the
dark winter of 1864-65, North Carolina's Governor Zebulon Vance
commented on the supineness with which the southern population
received the invading Sherman. It was evidence, said Vance, of
what he had "always believed, that the great popular heart is not
now, and never has been in this war! It was a revolution of the
Politicians, not the People."^9

And when the cause was lost, Southerners abandoned it with
an alacrity which underscored the reluctance of their original
commitment. It was left for a leading ex-fire-eater to explain
why they returned to the Union of their fathers with so little
hesitation. Standing before the Joint Congressional Committee
on Reconstruction in 1866, James D. B. De Bow attested in all
sincerity the South's willingness to fight once again for the flag
of the Union. "The southern people," he said, "are Americans,
republicans."^0

Yet it is idle to wonder whether secession represented the de-
liberate choice of a majority of white Southerners, or to speculate
about the outcome of a hypothetical referendum, free from am-
biguity, coercion, and hysteria. Decisions like the one that faced
the South in 1860-61 are never reached in any such ideal way.
And even had the South decided for the Union, its and the nation's
problem would have remained unsolved, and a violent resolution
would only have been postponed. Slavery was doomed by the
march of history and by the nature of Southerners themselves, but
so deeply had it involved them in its contradictions that they
could neither deal with it rationally nor longer endure the tensions
and anxieties it generated. Under these circumstances the Civil
War or something very like it was unavoidable. It was also
salutary, for only the transaction at Appomattox could have freed
the South's people—both Negro and white—to move again toward
the realization of their essential natures as Southerners, liberals,
Christians, and Americans.
CHAPTER THREE


2. Fletcher M. Green, “Listen to the Eagle Scream: One Hundred Years of the Fourth of July in North Carolina (1776-1876),” *North Carolina Historical Review*, XXXI (July, October, 1954), 36, 534.


5. Curti, American Loyalty, 68, 154; R. M. T. Hunter, An Address Delivered before the Society of Alumni of the University of Virginia . . . on the 4th of July, 1839 (Charlottesville, 1839), 4.


10. Goodloe, Southern Platform, 94.

11. Ibid., 3-5.


15. Lillian A. Kibler, Benjamin F. Perry, South Carolina Unionist (Durham, 1945), 31; Pulaski Tennessee Beacon and Farmers Advocate, June 16, 1832.


18. Goodloe, Southern Platform, 49.


22. Charles H. Ambler, The Life and Diary of John Floyd (Richmond, 1918), 172; Jenkins, Pro-Slavery Thought, 88n.

23. Nashville Republican, October 22, 1825.


27. Stampp, Peculiar Institution, 422-25; Washington United States Telegraph, December 5, 1835.


NOTES FOR PAGES 54-69

31. Jenkins, Pro-Slavery Thought, 236; Stampp, Peculiar Institution, 383.
38. Stampp, Peculiar Institution, 193; D. R. Hundley, Social Relations in Our Southern States (New York, 1860), 193.
40. Stampp, Peculiar Institution, 89-90, 141, 191.
42. Stampp, Peculiar Institution, 422; Herbert Aptheker, American Negro Slave Revolts (New York, 1945), 59-60.
43. Jenkins, Pro-Slavery Thought, 214-18.
44. Jay B. Hubbell, "Literary Nationalism in the Old South," in David K. Jackson, ed., American Studies in Honor of William Kenneth Boyd (Durham, 1946), 183n.; David Outlaw to Mrs. David Outlaw, July [28], 1848, David Outlaw Papers (Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina); Robert W. Barnwell to Robert Barnwell Rhett, November 1, 1844, Robert Barnwell Rhett Papers (Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina).
46. Jenkins, Pro-Slavery Thought, 239-40.
49. Goodloe, Southern Platform, 93.
50. Jenkins, Pro-Slavery Thought, 281; Harvey Wish, George Fitzhugh:Propagandist of the Old South (Baton Rouge, 1943), 111.
51. Wish, Fitzhugh, 111.
53. Stampp, Peculiar Institution, 278; Schultz, Nationalism and Sectionalism, 158-59.
55. Crenshaw, Slave States, 100, 103, 106; Laura A. White, "The South in
the 1850's as Seen by British Consuls," *Journal of Southern History*, I (February, 1935), 44.


60. *Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, at the First Session,* Thirty-Ninth Congress (Washington, 1866), 133.