How Personalized Normative Feedback Affects Home Thermostat Settings

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ABSTRACT

Personalized Normative Feedback (PNF), personalized comparison to the average behavior of peers, has been shown to reduce residential energy use, but the underlying psychological mechanism is not well understood. To evaluate the merits of the Theory of Changing Normative Beliefs relative to the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct, I used Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to administer PNF about home thermostat settings to Chicago residents. From November 2012 to March 2013, I surveyed subjects about settings, normative beliefs, demographics, habits, and motivations and administered PNF to my treatment group (n = 16) but not my control (n = 8). I then followed up with subjects over a month later to find their new settings and beliefs. Subjects’ change in setting was not significantly predicted by initial setting. Normative beliefs were positively correlated with initial settings ($R^2 = 0.48$, $F(1,37) = 33.9$, $p < 0.0001$) and significantly improved a multivariate model of setting (ANOVA: $F(1,11) = 5.49$, $p < 0.05$). For the treatment group but not the control group, change in beliefs was negatively correlated with initial beliefs ($R^2 = -0.42$, $F(1,14) = 10.13$, $p < 0.01$) and change in behavior was positively correlated with change in beliefs ($R^2 = 0.46$, $F(1,14) = 11.96$, $p < 0.01$). The greatest decrease in settings came from subjects in the treatment group (n = 2) who initially believed the average setting was high and whose beliefs moved toward the norm conveyed by PNF. Overall, this pilot study supports the validity of the normative belief concept and offers preliminary support that PNF can affect repeated, private conservation behaviors by changing normative beliefs.

KEYWORDS

normative beliefs, misperception, Focus Theory of Normative Conduct, Social Norms Theory, Opower
INTRODUCTION

Many environmental problems are in large part caused by the aggregated choices of average people (Vandenbergh 2004, Jackson 2005). Climate change, for instance, is produced in large part by the cumulative choices of individuals regarding purchases, transportation, diet, and direct home energy consumption (Dernbach 2007). In the short term, it is often too expensive, impractical, or politically controversial for governmental bodies to adequately constrain and influence individuals’ decisions through traditional tools such as standards, prohibitions, and market-based interventions (Vandenbaugh 2004, Costa and Kahn 2010, Allcott and Mullainathan 2010). Furthermore, repeated studies have shown that the traditional tools of non-governmental environmental organizations are ineffective. That is, campaigns that rely solely on education, incentives, and appeals to social or environmental values have generally proven ineffective (Stern 1999, Stern 2000, Schultz 2002, Wilson and Dowlatabadi 2007, Goldstein et al. 2008, Nolan et al. 2008). Fortunately, there is a growing body of evidence that “social norming”—providing information about the common behavior or values of a social group—can affect individuals’ environmental behavior (Schultz et al. 2008). In addition, social norming is a lever that acts immediately, cost-effectively, and without controversial government intervention (Allcott 2011, Allcott and Mullainathan 2010).

Terminology

For the purposes of this paper, I distinguish between two types of norms: “injunctive norms,” which are what most people in a reference group think one ought to do, and “descriptive norms,” which are what most people in a reference group actually do (Cialdini et al. 1991). For example, an injunctive norm might be that 80% of Americans think one ought to vote in national elections. The corresponding descriptive norm might be that 3 in 5 Americans actually do vote in national elections.

Furthermore, I distinguish between “norms”—what most people in a reference group actually value or do—and “normative beliefs,” which are an individual’s perception of what is commonly valued or done by members of a reference group (Schultz et al. 2008, Nolan 2011). Descriptive normative beliefs are subconscious estimates of a descriptive norm based on three
Factors: observation of others, communication from third parties and media, and extrapolation from personal behavior (Nolan 2011, Lapinski and Real 2005, Fig 1). In this model, which I will refer to as the “three-factor model of normative belief generation,” normative beliefs are influenced by personal behavior through the false consensus effect—the tendency for individuals to think that other people believe what they believe and behave as they behave (Nolan 2011, Monin and Norton 2003, van der Pligt 2006, Baer et al. 1991). Although normative beliefs can be produced at any time, they do not persist in consciousness (Nolan 2011). They are not fixed, but rather dynamically update in response to new observation, communication, or changes in personal behavior (Nolan 2011, Monin and Norton 2003).

Fig 1. The three-factor model of normative belief generation. Dynamically updated, subconscious estimates of the prevalence of different behaviors are based on (1) observations of others, (2) communication from third parties and media, and (3) extrapolation from personal behavior. Self-knowledge sometimes informs normative beliefs through a false consensus effect, whereby individuals assume that the behavior of others is similar to their own behavior.

Models of social influence

In sociology and psychology, descriptive and injunctive normative beliefs are often modeled as sources of influence for individual behavior, especially when the individual attributes self-similarity, social significance, and/or value to the reference group (Schultz et al. 2008, Cialdini and Goldstein 2004, Lapinski et al. 2007). Beliefs about whether most people engage in a behavior (descriptive normative beliefs) have been shown to correlate with water conservation, household recycling, buying organic food, household energy conservation, and other pro-
environmental behaviors (Lapinkski et al. 2007, Thøgersen 2006, Nolan et al. 2008, Gockeritz et al. 2010). Beliefs about what most people approve of (injunctive normative beliefs), which may be inferred from descriptive normative beliefs (Thøgersen 2006), have been shown to correlate with transportation choice and choosing low home thermostat settings, for example (Bamberg et al. 2007, Black et al. 1985).

One limitation of these studies is that correlation does not distinguish between behavior conforming to normative beliefs and reported normative beliefs that are generated in part by extrapolating from personal behavior. Individual behavior conforming to group standards is a well-established phenomenon with documented mechanisms. These mechanisms may include trust in others’ judgment, anticipated social sanction, emulation of aspirational others, maintenance of group identity, an obligation to do one’s fair share, or expectations of aggregate outcome for group endeavors (Deutsch and Gerard 1955, Thøgersen 2006, Rimal and Real 2005, Abrams et al. 1990, Vandenbaugh 2004, Steg and de Groot). For the purposes of this paper, I will refer to all these mechanisms as “social influence.” Although it is plausible that normative beliefs affect behavior through social influence, it is also likely that normative beliefs (especially descriptive normative beliefs) are partially based on self-knowledge, and thus the correlation may capture a bi-directional causality—not the simple social influence that is commonly proposed.

Models of social norming

Public health interventions and the Theory of Changing Normative Beliefs

To the extent that social norming is the deliberate manipulation of normative beliefs, research on social norming may provide stronger proof of a causal relationship between normative beliefs and behavior than correlational studies can (Borsari and Carey 2001). Social norming either takes the form of “social marketing,” in which the same normative message is broadcast to everyone, or “personalized normative feedback,” in which each individual receives a personalized comparison to average behavior (Neighbors et al. 2004). For example, a social marketing intervention targeting home energy use conveyed the message “Join your neighbors in conserving energy . . . 77% of San Marcos residents often use fans instead of air conditioning to
keep cool in the summer” (Nolan et al. 2008). In contrast, a personalized normative feedback (PNF) approach to home energy conservation consisted of a graphical comparison of each resident’s energy use to the neighborhood average (a descriptive norm) (Allcott 2011). Homeowners received injunctive personalized normative feedback, too. For example, energy-efficient homeowners received congratulations for their low usage: “You should be proud . . . ” (Allcott 2011).

In the domain of public health, both social marketing and PNF are commonly designed with the intention of changing the normative beliefs of a target population (Borsari and Carey 2001, Perkins 2002). This framework, which I refer to here as the Theory of Changing Normative Beliefs (although it is sometimes called Social Norms Theory), is grounded in the assumptions that people’s normative beliefs influence their behavior, that social norming affects normative beliefs, and that those new normative beliefs will lead to behavior change (Carey et al. 2010, Borsari and Carey 2001). Public health researchers and professionals often seek to reduce risky behaviors, such as binge drinking, adolescent drug use, and unprotected sex, by disseminating information about the true prevalence of such behaviors (Blanton et al. 2008). This approach is implemented in cases where researchers have evidence that their target population has an inflated perception of how common the risky behavior is (Blanton et al. 2008).

For example, there have been many interventions to reduce collegiate binge drinking by debiasing students’ exaggerated descriptive normative beliefs (Baer et al. 1990, Borsari and Carey 2001). Most of these social norming interventions are bundled with other preventative strategies, such as education about outcomes or training in resisting social pressure, and their evaluation is often focused on how the manipulation of these bundles affects behavioral outcomes, rather than the psychological mechanisms responsible for the success or failure of interventions (Borsari and Carey 2001). One of the notable exceptions to this “black box,” outcome-driven tendency is a study in which researchers provided only descriptive personalized normative feedback to their treatment group and measured the change in normative beliefs and behavior of their subjects in control and treatment (Neighbors et al. 2004). This study showed that PNF produced a persistent reduction in alcohol consumption that was mediated by a change in normative beliefs about alcohol consumption (Neighbors et al. 2004).
Opower and the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct

Research on pro-environmental social norming tends to forgo analyzing the mechanisms by which social norming affects environmental behavior, focusing instead on maximizing conservation (Ayres et al. 2009, Costa and Kahn 2010, Allcott 2011), evaluating social marketing relative to other techniques of persuasion (Nolan et al. 2008, Goldstein et al. 2008), or evaluating PNF relative to other forms of feedback (Schultz 1999, Jensen 1986, Fischer 2008). The study and application of pro-environmental PNF has been dominated by the company Opower and sociologist Robert Cialdini, who is both Chief Scientist at Opower and the lead theorist behind the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct, a model of social influence (Allcott and Mullainathan 2010, Davis 2011, Opower 2013, Cialdini et al. 1991). Opower partners with utilities to provide Home Energy Reports: letters to homeowners that include graphical comparison to the energy consumption of “all neighbors” and “efficient neighbors” and personalized injunctive feedback in the form of smiley faces (Allcott 2011, Fig 5b). The reports also include personalized energy conservation tips with estimated cost savings (Allcott 2011). For example, a personalized tip might inform a homeowner that she can save $30 per year by installing occupancy sensors (Allcott 2011). Opower Home Energy Reports produce an average of 2-3% energy savings at a cost of 3-5 cents per avoided kilowatt-hour (Opower 2012, Allcott 2011). The three major academic analyses of Opower’s Home Energy Reports have all shown a persistent effect, as did an analysis of PNF targeting residential recycling (Costa and Kahn 2010, Ayres et al. 2009, Allcott 2011, Schultz 1999).

The persistent behavioral change induced by pro-environmental personalized normative feedback interventions is not just practically significant, but also theoretically intriguing. Opower’s Home Energy Reports are highly informed by their Chief Scientist Robert Cialdini (whose views on social influence highlight the role of norm salience and unconscious processes), and they are closely modeled on a 2007 intervention that sought to apply Cialdini’s Focus Theory of Normative Conduct to reducing residential energy consumption (Cialdini et al. 1991, Rosenberg 2013, Opower 2013, Schultz et al. 2007, Allcot 2011). According to the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct, all norms do not affect us all the time, but rather norms affect our behavior when our social or physical context focuses our attention on what is commonly done or valued (Cialdini et al. 1991). The theory is based on a series of experiments by Robert Cialdini
that show that subjects’ one-time tendency to litter tends to conform to either descriptive or injunctive norms to the extent that environmental cues and priming draw their attention to those norms (Cialdini et al. 1991). Such cues included observation of others’ littering behavior, observation of a confederate’s littering behavior, and seemingly mass-produced pamphlets planted on the subjects’ windshield wipers with messages about injunctive norms pertaining to various pro-social behaviors (Cialdini et al. 1991). When the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct is applied to personalized normative feedback, the feedback is conceived of as a normative cue that tends to produce conformity in recipients such that their behavior is more in line with the conveyed norm (Schultz et al. 2007). This theoretical approach does not rely on an intervening change in normative beliefs.

Opower’s Home Energy Reports are different in kind from Cialdini’s littering experiments, as are all forms of PNF that target repeated pro-environmental behaviors (such as recycling) or important decisions (such as purchasing an efficient appliance). The Focus Theory of Normative Conduct is based on evidence that subtle priming and environmental factors can draw an individual’s attention to group standards of behavior or values and produce short-term conformity in behavior, possibly without the individuals being conscious of any normative influence on their behavior (Cialdini et al. 1991). In contrast, personalized normative feedback for recycling and home energy conservation involves an explicit, tailored communication about normative standards (Schultz 1999). Furthermore, if Home Energy Reports work by causing homeowners to act on the energy saving tips, then these pro-environmental interventions affect repeated behaviors, which are often executed after normative focus has faded, and purchasing decisions that likely involve significant conscious deliberation, which may affect mechanisms of social influence (Allcott 2011, Schultz et al. 2008). There are plausible explanations for how feedback could lead to a cascade of delayed cues that reinvigorate that normative focus (such as through conversations about the feedback or through the persistent physical presence of a Home Energy Report). However, it may be more useful and accurate to conceptualize the effect of personalized normative feedback as operating through more stable cognitive mechanisms. In light of the theory underlying public health interventions, changing normative beliefs are a likely candidate for a durable mechanism by which personalized normative feedback might affect repeated behaviors and major purchasing decisions (Allcott 2011).
Objectives of the current research

The current pilot study is designed to evaluate whether change in repeated residential energy conservation behaviors (home thermostat settings) induced by PNF can be best understood as the product of changing normative beliefs. This overarching research question represents a novel application of the dominant paradigm in public health social norming. To test the relative merits of the Theory of Changing Normative Beliefs, I first evaluate the explanatory power of the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct, which in this context merely predicts conformity to the descriptive norm based on initial behavior. I will then test the validity of four sequential assumptions of the Theory of Changing Normative Beliefs:

1) that normative beliefs are correlated with behavior;
2) that normative beliefs are influenced by PNF;
3) that behavior shifts in tandem with belief change; and
4) that the behavioral change that occurs is predominantly tied to beliefs that are shifting toward the norm conveyed by PNF.

METHODS

Individualized comparisons to the norm of overnight thermostat setting

To evaluate the ability of the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct and the Theory of Changing Normative Beliefs to explain how PNF affects home thermostat settings, I delivered PNF to subjects in my treatment group (n=16) and measured their change in behavior and normative beliefs. The PNF was designed to shift each subject’s “overnight thermostat setting” toward the descriptive norm for overnight thermostat setting in the study population, possibly by shifting their focus to that norm and possibly through an intervening shift in normative beliefs. In the surveys I administered to subjects, I defined overnight thermostat setting as “the temperature that your household's thermostat is set to when most members of the household are asleep.”
Why overnight thermostat settings?

My primary consideration in selecting a behavior was that I wanted to choose a private, repeated behavior that affects household energy use. Opower’s PNF is interesting in that it affects behaviors that are unseen by society and thus less likely to be shaped by social sanction than many behaviors targeted in public health social norming (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004, Abrams et al. 1990). Surveys of homeowners who received Home Energy Reports show that Opower’s PNF also affects behaviors that are repeated (including maintaining a lower thermostat setting), and thus unlikely to always be performed when homeowners are focused on social norms (Carrol et al. 2009, Schultz 1999). Thermostat setting is a residential energy behavior that is both anonymous and repeated, and thus has psychologically interesting parallels to previous pro-environmental social norming.

I focused the study on subjects’ selection of overnight thermostat setting because this behavior is easily self-reported and quantified, significantly affects home energy consumption (Vine 1986, Peffer et al 2011), and can be influenced by a modest intervention (Black et al. 1985). It was important that the target behavior could be self-reported, because I do not have access to data on anyone’s overall energy consumption or the resources to directly measure subjects’ home energy behavior. By restricting my behavior to overnight thermostat setting, I increase the likelihood that subjects are referring to the same behavior.

Overnight thermostat setting was also a suitable choice of target behavior because it varies continuously with small differences between possible values (degrees Fahrenheit). Choosing a precisely quantifiable behavior increased the likelihood of capturing small effects of the intervention and the similarity to interventions that affect kg of recycling or kWh of conserved energy (Schultz 1999, Opower 2012). Another reason I chose this target behavior is that residential thermostats control 9% of energy consumption in the United States (Peffer et al. 2011), which increases the potential real-world applicability of the findings.

A final and important reason I chose overnight thermostat setting as the target behavior is because it is easily influenced by a subtle, one-time social norming intervention. Thermostat setting is likely to be influenced by persuasive messaging because changing one’s thermostat setting is relatively simple, fast, and involves no intervening steps (Fuller et al. 2010, McKenzie-Mohr 2000). Furthermore, energy conservation behaviors—such as lowering
thermostat settings—generally has fewer barriers than energy efficiency behaviors—such as buying more efficient appliances or upgrading one’s residence (Black et al. 1985). Thermostat setting in particular is more tied to injunctive normative beliefs—which may be inferred from descriptive normative beliefs (Thøgersen 2006)—than other residential energy conservation behaviors (Black et al. 1985). Descriptive norms are more influential when there are perceived benefits to aligning behavior with the group (Rimal and Real 2005, Rimal et al. 2005, Vandenbaugh 2004), which applies to thermostat settings because subjects either save money by decreasing their settings toward the norm or increase comfort by increasing their settings toward the norm.

**Overview of experimental design**

My experimental design consisted of three phases: (1) a preliminary survey to identify the average overnight thermostat setting of the study population; (2) a baseline survey, which included questions about each subject’s overnight setting and normative beliefs and ended with PNF comparing each subject’s setting to the average setting calculated from the preliminary survey; (3) a follow-up survey to measure each subject’s new thermostat setting and descriptive normative belief. This ideal experimental design was complicated by three main factors: (1) I assigned subjects in the preliminary survey to the control group and measured their change in settings and beliefs; (2) there was a second batch of the baseline survey and follow-up survey to recruit more subjects; (3) 85% of subjects in the first baseline survey received PNF and 100% of subjects in the second baseline survey received PNF (Fig 2).
Fig 2. Overview of my experimental design. Respondents to the preliminary survey provided the information on average behavior that I later conveyed to subjects in the treatment group. There were two batches of baseline surveys, roughly one month apart. At the end of the first, 85% of respondents received PNF. At the end of the second, 100% of respondents received PNF.
Phase 1: Preliminary survey

Participants, study site

**Amazon’s Mechanical Turk:** To cheaply reach a large, diverse, non-local population, I used Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to obtain participants for my study. MTurk is an online crowdsourcing tool that allows anyone to pay for the completion of small, simple tasks or for MTurk workers (“Turkers”) to complete tasks for money (Amazon Mechanical Turk 2012, [http://mturk.com/](http://mturk.com/)). Turkers from America differ somewhat from the general population, but there have been studies of these differences and I also gathered demographic data from all participants to gauge the external validity of the findings (Ross et al. 2010, Ipeirotis 2010). The most significant difference between American Turkers and Americans is that about two thirds of Turkers are female (Ross et al. 2010). Although the wages on MTurk can be very low, which might lead one to assume that Turkers are disproportionately poor, Turkers mostly do not engage in MTurk out of financial necessity (Ross et al. 2010, Kaufmann et al. 2011). MTurk is a budding tool for social scientists, because it allows researchers to obtain a large sample of empirically reliable subjects from all over the world for very little cost (Paolacci et al. 2010, Rand 2012).

To ensure that the average setting I calculated from the preliminary survey would feel relevant to the subjects, I required that test subjects all live in a single city. An important byproduct of this limitation is that I reduced climatic variability, but the size of the study area was primarily constrained by the goal that subjects view the residents of the study area as self-similar. This goal stems from the well-supported theory that people respond more strongly to the norms of those whom they see as being similar to them, because this gives more practical and psychological significance to social norms (Rimal and Real 2005, Abrams et al. 1990, Terry and Hogg 2000, Smith and Louis 2008). I double-checked the ZIP codes of all respondents and removed all data from respondents outside the city of Chicago.

**Chicago:** I chose Chicago because it is cold and populous. The average monthly temperature in Chicago for all the months during which I conducted my study was 34 degrees (NOAA 2006). Because Chicago is so cold, subjects were more likely to have potential perceived benefits to
conforming to descriptive norms, regardless of whether they initially had below- or above-average settings. The cold magnifies the financial incentive to reduce thermostat settings and the comfort gained by increasing thermostat settings. Another reason I chose Chicago is that it is the third most populous city in the United States in 2010 after New York and Los Angeles with a population of almost 2.7 million people (United States Census Bureau 2010). Because the distribution of MTurk users is roughly the same as the overall population distribution (Ipeirotis 2010), choosing Chicago increased the chances of getting enough respondents. (Los Angeles is too warm and I have anecdotal evidence that many people in New York either do not pay their own heating bills or do not have control over the ambient temperature in their apartments.)

**Geographic restriction using MTurk qualifications:** Because MTurk does not allow Requesters to limit the Turkers who complete their task to a specific city, I enlisted the help of Dahn Tahrir, a researcher who has compiled the locations of 50,000 Turkers worldwide. Dahn shared the worker IDs of the 337 Turkers who recently self-identified as living in Chicago and whose IP addresses he had verified to be within the city limits. For each round of surveys, I assigned a qualification to the Chicago Turkers who had not completed previous surveys. When Turkers are assigned a qualification, they receive an email with the name of that qualification, so I included the URL of my survey in the qualification title, along with an invitation to participate. I sought to make qualification emails increasingly persuasive for each successive batch of Turkers, because they had been unmoved by all previous attempts enlist their participation (Fig 3).

![Fig 3. An email alerting Turkers who had declined several batches of invitations that they were invited to participate in my survey.](image)
Turkers who clicked the link in the qualification email were invited to participate in “A 5-minute survey about home thermostat settings and demographics” that they were informed was being conducted by a U.C. Berkeley student for the purpose of an undergraduate thesis.

Within two days of the first batch of qualification emails, 31 of the 337 Turkers had completed the preliminary survey. Each Turker received $0.50 for completing the preliminary survey, which is a high wage for MTurk given the brevity of the survey (Polacci et al. 2010).

As with all my subjects, I filtered the respondents to my preliminary survey according to several criteria. I removed all subjects who provided wildly unrealistic answers or answered the whole survey in under a minute. I also removed respondents who did not provide a ZIP code in the City of Chicago. I designated as “fully eligible” only those respondents who paid their own heating bill and had exactly one thermostat in their household that they were able to control. For all analysis of behavior change, I looked only at fully eligible subjects in order to control for the presence of personal financial incentive, which could be a major confounding variable, and to ensure that all subjects were capable of engaging in a behavior that was equivalent (changing their household’s singular thermostat).

Preliminary Survey Questions

I first determined the norm for overnight thermostat setting by conducting a preliminary survey in which I asked subjects to estimate their average overnight thermostat setting in the week preceding the survey. Because I would later use subjects from the preliminary survey in the control group, I also asked basic demographic questions, questions about what motivated participants to set their thermostat as they did, and questions about thermostat usage (Appendix A). Because the preliminary survey was identical to the baseline survey except for the absence of PNF, a more detailed justification for the preliminary survey questions can be found in the section “Baseline Survey Questions.”
Phase 2: Baseline survey and PNF

Participants

Throughout my experiment, each successive round of surveys was open to Turkers from Chicago who had not filled out previous surveys. Due to low response rates and low rates of fully eligible respondents, I made several modifications to my ideal experimental design. The most significant was that I conducted two batches of baseline surveys and follow-up surveys to augment my sample size. I also added the respondents from my preliminary survey as my control group, which gave me a surplus of control subjects relative to treatment subjects. I corrected this imbalance and achieved an adequate number of subjects in treatment by randomly providing PNF to 85% of my first batch of baseline respondents and 100% of my second batch. Payment also was not constant between batches or within batches. Subjects in later batches tended to receive higher wages as did subjects who responded on later days within a given batch ($1.25 to $2 in the first baseline survey, $2 in the first follow-up survey, $2 to $3 in the second baseline survey, and $2 to $3 in the second follow-up survey). Every subject received every invitation to participate in the study until that subject finally participated, which meant that later subjects had found the invitations up until that point to be insufficiently motivational. As a result, later subjects required more invitations per batch and higher financial incentives to overcome their increased reluctance to participate.

Baseline survey questions

In the baseline survey, the two most important questions I asked were: (1) “In the last week, what was your average overnight thermostat setting?” and (2) “What do you think the average overnight thermostat setting was for all households in Chicago in the last week?” I interpreted the answer to the first question as the subject’s initial overnight thermostat setting and the answer to the second question as the subject’s normative beliefs about overnight thermostat setting.

To ensure that subjects were capable of engaging in the behavior change, I also asked all the subjects if they had exactly one thermostat in their household that they were able to set. I
asked if the subjects had exactly one thermostat because subjects with no thermostat could not engage in behavior change and subjects with more than one thermostat did not necessarily have a single setting and would not be engaging in the same behavior change as subjects with a single thermostat. I asked the subjects if they could control their households’ thermostat settings because those subjects who could not control their settings could not engage in the desired behavior change. Those subjects from the preliminary survey and the baseline survey who did not have exactly one thermostat that they could control were not invited to participate in the follow-up survey.

To check for external validity and internal validity, and to understand whether subjects’ thermostat behavior was habitual, I also asked subjects about demographics, thermostat usage, and what factors motivated their thermostat setting. I asked whether subjects had a thermostat that could be programmed to change automatically at a certain time, because subjects with programmable thermostats would be engaging in a one-time behavior change, which is easier. The survey instrument is in Appendix A.

**Post-survey PNF**

To measure the change in overnight thermostat setting due only to social norming, I included PNF at the end of the baseline survey for some subjects and had other subjects take surveys without PNF.

To approximate Opower’s PNF but introduce a minimum of variables that would confound the effect of norm misperception, I designed the intervention to closely resemble just the descriptive normative component of Opower’s feedback (Fig 4, Fig 5). The intervention was a computer-generated, individualized graphical comparison between (1) the subject’s thermostat setting, (2) the average (median) setting from the preliminary survey, and (3) the bottom 20th percentile thermostat setting from the preliminary survey. Although including the 20th percentile setting complicated the analysis, I chose to include the “efficient” norm to increase the real-world applicability of the study by more closely approximating Opower’s feedback, which seeks to effect unidirectional behavioral change. Because the relative difference between even uncommonly high and low thermostat settings is graphically unimpressive, I designed the feedback to emphasize the absolute difference between the subject’s setting and the norm and the
20\textsuperscript{th} percentile setting and the norm. I emphasized the absolute difference by essentially making the norm the horizontal axis and then graphing the deviations of the subject’s setting and efficient setting from the norm.

(a) \textbf{Citywide Comparison} \\

![Figure 4](image1.png)

(b) \textbf{Citywide Comparison} \\

![Figure 4](image2.png)

\textbf{Fig 4.} Two examples of my PNF comparing (1) the subject’s thermostat setting (below-average (a), above-average (b)), (2) the average (median) setting from the preliminary survey, and (3) the bottom 20\textsuperscript{th} percentile thermostat setting from the preliminary survey.
Fig 5. (a) An example of my PNF comparing (1) the subject’s thermostat setting (average), (2) the average (median) setting from the preliminary survey, and (3) the bottom 20th percentile thermostat setting from the preliminary survey; (b) Two key components of Opower’s Home Energy Report: personalized energy saving tips and a PNF comparing (1) the recipient’s household energy consumption, (2) the average energy consumption for nearby residents with similar home characteristics, and (3) the bottom 20th percentile of energy consumption for nearby residents with similar home characteristics. Opower’s PNF also includes an injunctive norm (Great 😊 😊 / Good 😊 / Below average).

Although modern Opower letters contain an injunctive norm, energy saving tips, and a statement of how much money homeowners could save by implementing each set of tips, I chose not to include any of these elements so that the data would reflect more purely the isolated effect.
of a single aspect of social norming on behavior change. I excluded the injunctive norm that Opower traditionally includes (in the form of smiley faces and praise), because the variability associated with a qualitatively different type of norm did not seem worth the increased real-world applicability. I did not include energy conservation tips because the target behavior is self-explanatory and it would confound my data. I did not include an estimate of monetary savings because it would be a confounding variable.

To ensure that the subjects attended to the intervention, they were asked to correctly recall how their setting compared to the average setting before they could proceed to the webpage with the survey completion code.

**Phase 3: Follow-up survey**

**Participants**

At least a month after the completion of their initial survey, I sent qualification emails to the fully eligible Turkers who had completed the preliminary survey and the baseline survey inviting them to complete a follow-up survey. I chose one month because I wanted to study the persistent effects of PNF.

**Follow-up survey questions**

To determine the effect of feedback, I asked subjects from both the control and treatment groups to once again estimate for the last week their average overnight thermostat setting and the average overnight thermostat setting was for all households in Chicago.

**Analysis**

**Internal and external validity**

To assess the internal validity of my results, I used two-sample t-tests to compare the initial settings and beliefs of my control and treatment groups. To confirm that outdoor
temperatures did not affect my results, I first regressed initial settings against various outdoor temperature variables and then regressed initial beliefs against various outdoor temperature variables. I also regressed the change in settings against the change in temperature variables and the change in beliefs against the change in temperature variables. I downloaded outdoor temperature data from NOAA (NOAA 2006). To assess the external validity of my results, I compared summary statistics for various demographic variables to the averages for MTurk users, Chicagoans, and Americans.

Evaluating the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct

My experiment was not designed to test the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct as a whole, but specifically to test whether Focus Theory of Normative Conduct, as applied in the study that inspired Opower’s Home Energy Report (Schultz et al. 2007), can explain how PNF affects behavior better than the Theory of Changing Normative Beliefs can. Although a thorough test of the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct would measure the association between normative focus and concurrent behavior, I worked with only the data that was evaluated in the descriptive normative portion of the energy conservation intervention that inspired Opower—initial and final behavior and whether subjects had their attention focused on a descriptive norm. I tested whether subjects who received PNF conformed their behavior to the norm more than subjects in the control group.

To determine whether subjects who receive PNF will conform their behavior to the norm more than subjects in the control group, I categorized subjects in the control and treatment groups by their initial setting relative to the norm (below-average, average, above-average) and tested for significant differences in behavior change (Schultz et al. 2007). I used a two-way ANOVA with interaction effects to test whether subjects who were initially below, at, and above 68 degrees had significantly different average changes in settings depending on whether they received PNF. To test within the treatment group and within the control group for differences in behavior change between initial setting groups, I employed Kruscal-Wallis one-way ANOVAs, which test whether the medians of non-parametric samples (behavior change for initial setting groups) are significantly different. For all of the tests, I used only fully eligible subjects with Chicago ZIP codes.
Practical questions

Is change in setting correlated with initial setting? I also investigated two questions that do not directly pertain to the relative merits of the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct and the Theory of Changing Normative Beliefs. The first was how well initial setting predicts change in behavior when viewed continuously instead of categorically. Although the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct does predict conformity in proportion to initial deviance from the norm, whoever is administering PNF always, by necessity, knows the initial behavior of individuals, which makes initial behavior a potential practical predictor of behavior change. Analysts at Opower and social scientists have found that baseline usage is the strongest predictor of behavior change in response to PNF targeting residential recycling or energy conservation (Allcott 2011, Ayres et al. 2009, Schultz 1999). There has been mixed evidence as to whether individuals who conserve more than average initially decrease their conservation in response to PNF—the so-called “boomerang effect” (Allcott 2011, Schultz et al. 2007, Fischer 2008, Jensen 1986). In an attempt to thwart a possible boomerang effect, Opower includes individualized injunctive feedback (praise for low initial energy use and conspicuously absent praise for high initial energy use) (Schultz et al. 2007). There is conflicting research on the efficacy of this approach (Schultz et al. Allcott 2011).

To analyze how change in settings varies with initial settings, I regressed change in setting against initial setting for both the control and treatment groups independently. I used only fully eligible subjects with Chicago ZIP codes. To analyze whether there was a boomerang effect, I compared linear regressions for all of the data to linear regressions for only the subjects who had average or above-average initial settings. Finally, I used an ANCOVA to see whether the effect of initial setting on change in setting was due to subjects’ response to PNF or if it represented an independent phenomenon (such as regression to the mean).

Is there a bias to the inaccuracy of normative beliefs? The second question of practical significance was how normative beliefs related to the true descriptive norm. Although injunctive norms are one way to achieve unidirectional behavior change, de-biasing inflated normative beliefs is another. For each batch of initial surveys, I calculated the inaccuracy of each subject’s
normative beliefs as the difference between the subject’s normative beliefs and the median of that subject’s initial survey batch. I used a t-test to compare the mean of all misperceptions to 0 and analyzed summary statistics for the distribution of the misperception to evaluate whether there was a bias in subjects’ errors. Because I was interested in initial misperception and not response to treatment, I included all initial responses (both control and treatment) from respondents with Chicago ZIP codes, including those who were not fully eligible.

**Evaluating the Theory of Changing Normative Beliefs**

**Are initial normative beliefs correlated with initial behavior?** To test whether normative beliefs were correlated with initial behavior, I regressed normative belief against initial setting. I used all initial responses (both control and treatment) from respondents with Chicago ZIP codes, including those who were not fully eligible. To evaluate whether there was a systematic tendency for subjects’ beliefs to be higher or lower than their own behavior, I compared the difference of each subject’s setting and belief to 0 with a single-sample t-test. To test whether the difference between beliefs and settings depends on initial setting, I regressed the difference between each subject’s belief and setting against his or her initial setting.

Initial settings and normative beliefs may be influenced by other factors, such as the temperature outside (Kempton 1986), demographic factors (Stern et al. 1983, Black et al. 1985, Vine 1986, Vine and Barnes 1988), and motivations for thermostat setting to the extent that they correlate with attitudes (Stern et al. 1983, Black et al. 1985). To capture the unique predictive contribution of normative beliefs beyond these factors, I made nested linear models with successively more groups of variables (Nolan et al. 2008). First, to assess the influence of outside temperature alone on settings, I regressed initial setting against temperature variables (minimum daily temperature and average monthly temperature). Then, to evaluate the additional predictive power of demographic variables, I simultaneously added demographic variables to the model (age, income bracket, years of schooling, household size, homeownership, and whether subjects paid for their heating). Next, to understand the unique contribution of motivations in addition to temperature and demographics, I simultaneously added self-reported motivation for initial setting to the model (concern with the environment, comfort, wastefulness, and personal finance transformed from “None,” “A little,” “A moderate amount,” “A lot” to 0, 1, 2, 3).
Finally, to determine how much of the predictive power of normative beliefs remained after the effects of outside temperature, demographics, and self-reported influences on thermostat settings had been accounted for, I added normative beliefs to the model. I used an ANOVA to distinguish which additions to the model significantly improved its predictive capacity. For real-world applications and to better understand the external validity of my results, I stripped away the least significant variables from the model one at a time until the second-order Akaike's Information Criterion score increased appreciably. This process allowed me to create the most parsimonious but maximally predictive model of thermostat setting and to understand which climatic, demographic, motivational, and perceptual factors most heavily influence thermostat settings.

The first time I ran the nested models, I left out political affiliation variables from the demographic level (whether the subject was a Democrat and whether the subject was a Republican). I wished to better understand the effect of political affiliation in light of evidence from Costa and Kahn that Democrats and Republicans respond very differently to Opower’s Home Energy Reports, so I re-ran the models with political affiliation variables in the demographic tier.

**Does PNF influence normative beliefs?** To evaluate whether normative beliefs moved toward 68 as a result of the treatment group, I regressed change in normative beliefs against initial normative beliefs for the control and treatment groups and compared my results. I also qualitatively analyzed the distribution of normative beliefs initially and in the followup for both the control and treatment groups. For both of these investigations, I used only fully eligible subjects with Chicago ZIP codes. Finally, I used an ANCOVA to see whether the effect of initial belief on change in belief was due to subjects’ response to PNF or if it represented an independent phenomenon (such as regression to the mean).

**Does change in normative beliefs predict change in behavior?** To test whether a change in normative beliefs was associated with a change in behavior, I regressed change in normative beliefs against change in behavior for both my control and treatment groups and compared the results. I used only fully eligible subjects with Chicago ZIP codes.
Is behavior change associated with beliefs shifting toward the conveyed norm? I wanted to differentiate between behavior moving in tandem with randomly changing normative beliefs (which might be caused by behavior affecting beliefs through the false consensus effect) and behavior moving in tandem with beliefs that conform to the norm conveyed by PNF (which is more likely a result of social influence and generally representative of the Theory of Changing Normative Beliefs). To do this, I made a plot that simultaneously displayed the initial setting, final setting, initial beliefs, and final beliefs of each subject in the control and treatment groups and qualitatively analyzed the patterns that emerged. For my qualitative analysis, I used only fully eligible subjects with Chicago ZIP codes.

RESULTS

Participants

Internal validity

My control and treatment groups were systematically different across several dimensions. All but one member of the control group was contacted earlier and had almost twice as long between initial assessment and follow-up as members of the control group (Fig 6a, Fig 6b). These differences in timing corresponded with differences in daily average temperatures, daily minimum daily temperatures, and monthly average temperatures (Fig 7).
Fig 6. Subjects in the control group had longer delay times and were generally contacted sooner. (a) Initial and follow-up settings and initial and follow-up survey dates for all fully eligible members of the control and treatment groups. The mean initial settings of the control and treatment groups were not significantly different. (b) Initial and follow-up normative beliefs and initial and follow-up survey dates for all fully eligible members of the control and treatment groups. The mean initial normative beliefs of the control and treatment groups were not significantly different.
Fig 7. Monthly average, daily average, and daily minimum outdoor temperatures in Chicago corresponding to the dates on which subjects took initial or follow-up surveys. Outdoor temperature data for intervening dates is excluded. Outdoor temperatures became generally colder from November to January and then began warming again. The coldest temperatures were during the second baseline survey.

For all initial respondents, there was not a statistically significant correlation between initial thermostat setting and daily minimum temperature or between initial thermostat setting and monthly average temperature. Nor was there a statistically significant correlation between initial normative beliefs and daily minimum temperature or between initial normative beliefs and monthly average temperature. For both the control and treatment groups, there were not statistically significant correlations between subjects’ change in thermostat setting and the change in daily minimum temperature or average monthly temperature nor any linear combination of those temperature variables. Change in beliefs was similarly not correlated with the change in any combination of temperature variables. The average initial settings for my control (67.4 degrees) and treatment (68.1 degrees) groups were not significantly different (Welch’s two sample t-test: $t = 0.34$, $df = 14.5$, $p = 0.74$), nor were average initial normative beliefs for my control (69.4 degrees) and treatment (68.4 degrees) groups significantly different (Welch’s two sample t-test: $t = -0.61$, $df = 12.0$, $p = 0.55$).

Respondents in my treatment and control groups were qualitatively similar in their education levels, political affiliation, thermostat characteristics and habits, self-reported concerns and influences for thermostat setting, and time spent completing the survey. The most striking difference between the control and treatment groups was that while roughly two thirds of my
control subjects and roughly two thirds of all initial subjects were female, only 18% of the respondents in the treatment group were female.

**External validity**

In the aggregate, initial respondents were similar to the overall U.S. population and Chicago population in household size and median income, but they were more educated, and disproportionately female (Table 1). My initial respondents were younger than the average American but not the average Chicago resident. Compared to MTurk workers from the United States, my respondents were similar in age (median age in mid-thirties) and gender (roughly 2/3 female), but they had higher education levels and income (Ross et al. 2010). The majority of respondents were Democrats (53%) and renters (60%), although there was a plurality of Independents (32%) and homeowners (34%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Demographic summary statistics for respondents, Chicago residents, and Americans.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variable</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean household size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median household income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% high school grad or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% bachelors or higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median age</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

My survey also yielded information about respondents’ self-reported motivations for choosing their thermostat settings. Overall, respondents reported that their choice of thermostat setting was most influenced by concern for comfort and personal finances, slightly less influenced by concern with being wasteful, even less influenced by environmental concerns, and almost not at all influenced by political concerns (Fig 8).
Fig 8. Distribution of self-reported influences on thermostat setting. Concern with comfort and personal finances were the most influential.

Evaluating the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct

The interaction between initial setting group and receiving treatment produced nearly significant differences in mean change in setting (two-way ANOVA: $F(2,26) = 3.28, p = 0.054$). However, within the treatment group and within the control group, the median setting was not significantly different depending on whether their initial settings were below average, average, or above average (Treatment, Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA: $X^2 = 3.95, df = 2, p = 0.14$; Control, Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA: $X^2 = 1.28, df = 2, p = 0.53$).

Fig 9. Change in thermostat setting as a function of initial setting group (below-average, average, or above-average) for fully eligible subjects from Chicago in both control and treatment. There are not significant differences in the median of change in setting between initial setting groups. There are not significant differences in the median of change in setting due to the combined effect of initial setting group and whether the subject received PNF.
Practical Questions

*Is change in setting correlated with initial setting?*

A linear regression of change in setting against initial setting for the treatment group was not significant ($R^2 = -0.2105$, $F(1,14) = 3.73$, $p = 0.07$, Fig 10). The same regression applied to only the data for which initial setting is 68 or greater yields an adjusted $R^2$ of -0.47 and is almost significant at a 1% level ($R^2 = -0.53$, $F(1,9) = 9.97$, $p = 0.012$, Fig 10). For this subset of the data, the slope of the linear model is -0.61 ($\pm 0.19$) degrees of change in setting for every additional degree of initial setting.

![Fig 10. Change in setting as a function of initial setting for the control and treatment groups. For subjects in the treatment group with average or above-average initial settings, change in setting decreases with initial setting ($p < 0.05$). Subjects A, B, and C are noteworthy because they all have very high initial settings, but only subjects A and B decreased their settings. The negative proportionality between initial setting and change in setting does not extend to subjects in the treatment group with below-average initial settings. Points are jittered to prevent overlap.](image)

For the control group, a linear regression of change in setting against initial setting is not significant ($R^2 = 0.21$, $F(1,6) = 1.603$, $p = 0.25$). The effect of initial setting as a continuous
variable on change in setting is significantly different for the control and treatment groups (ANCOVA: $F(1,28) = 7.29$, $p = 0.011$)

*Is there a bias to the inaccuracy of normative beliefs?*

The median initial thermostat setting for the preliminary survey, batch one of the baseline survey, and batch two of the baseline survey were 67.5, 68, and 70 degrees, respectively. The mean of all differences between subjects’ initial normative beliefs and the median initial setting for their batch was not significantly different from 0 (one-sample t-test: $t = 1.3$, $df = 38$, $p = 0.22$, Fig 11). The 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the inaccuracy of normative beliefs were -2.0, +0.5, and +2.5 degrees, respectively (Fig 11).

![Graph showing the distribution of the difference between each subject’s initial normative normative belief and the median thermostat setting for that subject’s initial survey batch. Data taken from all initial respondents from Chicago. The mean of the inaccuracy of normative beliefs is not significantly different from 0. A quarter of subjects overestimated the Chicago average by 2.5 degrees or more.](image-url)
Theory of Changing Normative Beliefs

Are initial normative beliefs correlated with initial behavior?

**Simple linear regressions:** A linear regression of initial normative beliefs against initial setting was significant, with a slope of +0.50 (± 0.09) degrees of initial normative belief for every additional degree of initial setting ($R^2 = 0.48$, $F(1,37) = 33.9$, $p < 0.001$, Fig 12).

![Graph showing the relationship between initial thermostat setting and normative belief.](image)

**Fig 12.** For all initial respondents in Chicago, initial normative beliefs increase with initial setting, but not as steeply as a one-to-one correspondence between initial settings and beliefs. Points are jittered to prevent overlap.

Although there was not a significant pattern to the residuals of the linear model, there was a noteworthy tendency for the difference between each subject’s normative belief and setting to decrease for higher settings ($R^2 = 0.48$, $F(1,37) = 33.7$, $p < 0.001$, Fig 13).
Fig 13. For all initial respondents in Chicago, subjects with lower initial settings were more likely to think their setting was below average and subjects with higher initial settings were more likely to think their setting was above average. Points are jittered to prevent overlap.

Overall, the average difference between each subject’s belief and setting (0.69 degrees) was not significantly different from 0 (One-sample t-test: $t = 1.42, df = 38, p = 0.16$). Of the 39 initial responses, 6 subjects thought their setting was exactly average, 21 thought most people had a higher setting than they did, and 12 thought most people had a lower setting than they did.

**Nested linear modeling:** The addition of normative beliefs to nested linear models improves the amount of variance explained and the overall likelihood that the model is correct. In the simplest model, temperature variables alone explained 22% of the variance in initial settings with monthly average temperature making the most significant contribution to the prediction of initial settings (intermediate models available in Appendix B). The addition of demographic variables to the model increased the explained variance to 52%. Income, monthly temperature, whether the subjects paid for their own heating were the most significant predictors in this model. Adding subjects self-reported motivations for thermostat setting increased the variance explained to 65% with concern for comfort being the most predictive new variable. Finally, the addition of initial normative beliefs to the model increased the variance explained to 85% (Fig 14, Table 2). Normative beliefs were an important factor in this final model; however, the magnitude of the
standardized effect of income and monthly average temperature were greater than the magnitude of the standardized effect of normative beliefs. Both income and monthly average temperature had higher probabilities of contributing to the final nested model (Table 3).

**Fig 14.** Percentage of the variance in initial settings explained by each nested model. Initial normative beliefs contributed an additional 20% to the variance in initial settings explained by the model.

**Table 2.** Correlation and significance for nested models. The addition of normative beliefs increased the adjusted $R^2$ of the model by 23% and yielded the most significant model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Outside temperature</th>
<th>Outside temperature + demographics</th>
<th>Outside temperature + demographics + motivations</th>
<th>Outside temperature + demographics + motivations + beliefs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multiple $R^2$</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p$ Value</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. Standardized estimates, $t$-values, and $p$-values for the final model containing outdoor temperature variables, demographic variables, self-reported influences on thermostat setting, and citywide descriptive normative beliefs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Beta (standardized)</th>
<th>t-Value</th>
<th>p-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Normative beliefs</td>
<td>+0.59</td>
<td>3.468</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comfort</td>
<td>+0.39</td>
<td>2.273</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasteful</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>1.601</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>-1.421</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.499</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.73</td>
<td>-3.614</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household size</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.286</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
<td>+0.39</td>
<td>2.027</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeowner</td>
<td>+0.28</td>
<td>1.418</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay heating</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>-2.317</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily min temp</td>
<td>+0.23</td>
<td>1.352</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly average</td>
<td>-0.74</td>
<td>-3.624</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The addition of demographic factors significantly improved the predictive capacity of the model (ANOVA: $F(6,18) = 3.65, p < 0.5$), but self-reported motivations did not (ANOVA: $F(4,14) = 3.27, p = 0.12$). Normative beliefs had the most significant change in the predictive capacity of the model (ANOVA: $F(1,13) = 4.36, p < 0.01$).

The ratio of explanatory power to density of the model (as measured by second-order AIC) was appreciably improved by removing the least significant variables one-by-one from the largest model ($AICc = 103.15$) until the model was based on only normative beliefs, monthly average temperature, income, whether the subjects paid for heating, and concern with comfort.
(AICc = 68.28). Reducing the model to beliefs, concern with comfort, and monthly temperature increased AICc to 69.6 and yielded a highly significant model ($R^2 = 0.50$, $F(3,23) = 7.715$, $p < 0.001$). A simple regression of setting against perception had an AICc of 72.6.

Although I did not include political affiliation variables in my main nested models, my additional exploration of nested models suggests that subjects who were Democrats tended to have lower initial settings. In the second-tier model with climatic and demographic variables, the influence of Democratic affiliation was significant and had the fourth largest effect size after monthly average outdoor temperature, whether subjects paid for heating, and income. However, in the final model, Democratic affiliation was not significant ($\beta$ (standardized) = -0.22, $t = -0.14$, $p = 0.18$). The inclusion of political affiliation variables into the nested models reduces the unique contribution of normative beliefs—it only adds 8% to the variance explained—but the addition of normative beliefs was still significant (Table 4, ANOVA: $F(1,11) = 5.49$, $p < 0.05$). The final model with political affiliation included had a worse ratio of explanatory power to parsimony as measured by the second-order AIC (AICc = 126.9).

**Table 4.** Correlation and significance for nested models with political affiliation variables added, beginning with the second-tier model. With political affiliation variables, the addition of normative beliefs increased the adjusted $R^2$ of the model by 13% and yielded the second most significant model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Outside temperature</th>
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<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adjusted $R^2$</strong></td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>p Value</strong></td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Does PNF influence normative beliefs?

For the treatment group, change in normative beliefs was significantly correlated with initial normative beliefs ($R^2 = -0.42$, $F(1,14) = 10.13$, $p < 0.01$, Fig 15). In the linear model, predicted normative beliefs decreased by -0.58 ($\pm 0.18$) for every additional degree of initial normative beliefs. The most common final beliefs were 68 and 65 (n=7, n =4). A quarter of subjects (n=4) of subjects shifted their beliefs to 68 exactly and 19% (n=3) of subjects remained at 68. Two subjects (13%) shifted their beliefs to 65, the 20th percentile setting conveyed in PNF, and another two maintained their beliefs at 65.

In the control group, a linear regression of change in beliefs against initial beliefs explained less of the variance, had a flatter slope (-0.1855 ± 0.11 degrees of belief change per degree initial beliefs), and was not significant ($R^2 = 0.33$, $F(1,6) = 3.02$, $p = 0.13$). The difference in the effect of initial beliefs on final beliefs was significantly different between the control and treatment groups (ANCOVA: $F(1,28) = 4.47$, $p < 0.05$, Fig 15).

In the control group, 63% of subjects (n=5) had no change in beliefs. There was also no significant correlation for the control data when I subossed it less strictly by adding in subjects who did not pay their own utilities or even by relinquishing the eligibility criteria altogether. No single value was overrepresented in the final beliefs. Two subjects reported 72 as their follow-up belief, making it the most represented final belief. No subjects reported 65 as their follow-up belief.
There was a significant negative correlation between change in beliefs and initial beliefs for subjects who received PNF ($p < 0.01$) but not for subjects in the control group. A disproportionate number of subjects in the treatment group had final beliefs that were 68 (gray diagonal line) or 65 (green diagonal line). Points are jittered to prevent overlap.

Is change in normative beliefs predictive of change in behavior?

For the treatment group, change in settings was significantly positively correlated with change in normative belief ($R^2 = 0.46$, $F(1,14) = 11.96$, $p < 0.01$, Fig 16). In the linear model, predicted change in settings increased by 0.71 degrees ($\pm 0.21$) for every additional degree of change in normative beliefs. However, this model is strongly leveraged by Subject D, who increased his thermostat setting and normative belief by 7 degrees (Fig 16). Without subject D, the correlation was much weaker and not significant ($R^2 = 0.18$, $F(1,13) = 2.782$, $p = 0.12$). It is noteworthy that subjects A and B, who were the two subjects with high initial settings who decreased their settings the most, decreased their settings and beliefs by substantial and roughly equivalent amounts, although each subject decreased his belief by slightly more than his setting (Fig 16).

For the control group, in contrast, change in settings was not significantly correlated with change in normative belief ($R^2 = 0.002$, $F(1,6) = 1.38$, $p = 0.91$).
Fig 16. For the treatment group but not the control group, a greater change in beliefs significantly correlates with a greater change in behavior, though the effect size is not as strong as a one-to-one correspondence between belief change and behavior change. Subjects A and B in the treatment group substantially decreased their settings and beliefs. Subject D substantially increased his setting and belief. Points are jittered to prevent overlap.

Is behavior change associated with beliefs shifting toward the conveyed norm?

By simultaneously visualizing initial settings, follow-up settings, initial beliefs, and follow-up beliefs for each subject, it is possible to see qualitative relationships between those variables and the difference between their initial and final values (Fig 17). The most noteworthy new information from this qualitative assessment is that subjects with high initial beliefs (n=2) who decreased their beliefs toward 68 had the largest decrease in settings. These two subjects (subjects A and B) decreased their settings roughly as much as they decreased their beliefs. The other subject with a significant change in settings (subject D) was the subject who strongly contributed to the positive correlation between change in settings and change in beliefs. Subject D did not change his beliefs to align with the conveyed norm, although he did change his settings as much as his beliefs. Instead, his beliefs shifted away from the norm conveyed by PNF, as did his behavior.
Fig 17. Initial settings, follow-up settings, initial beliefs, and follow-up beliefs for each fully eligible subject in the treatment group. Each arrow indicates a change in setting and/or belief of a subject between the initial survey and follow-up survey. Subjects A and B decreased their settings and beliefs. Subject C did not change his setting or belief. Subject D increased his setting and belief. Points are jittered to prevent overlap.

Fig 18. Initial settings, follow-up settings, initial beliefs, and follow-up beliefs for each fully eligible subject in the control group. Each arrow indicates a change in setting and/or belief of a subject between the initial survey and follow-up survey. Points are jittered to prevent overlap.
In the control group, no notable new information or patterns emerge through this visualization method. Only one subject had beliefs that moved toward the norm and only one subject had settings that moved roughly in tandem with beliefs (Fig 18).

**DISCUSSION**

The Theory of Changing Normative Beliefs explains the findings from this pilot study more powerfully than does the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct. To predict a subject’s change in thermostat setting in response to PNF, it is not sufficient to know that subject’s initial setting—it is also necessary to know whether that subject’s normative beliefs were influenced by PNF. Multiple lines of evidence support this conclusion. Initial setting as a categorical variable failed to predict differences in behavior change, discrediting the utility of the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct in this context. All four assumptions of the Theory of Changing Normative Beliefs were validated. Initial normative beliefs and initial settings were positively correlated, and there was a substantial effect size. These findings suggest that there is a strong (perhaps bi-directional) causal link between beliefs and settings, as has been demonstrated in previous studies of many other behaviors (Monin and Norton 2003, van der Pligt 2006, Lapinkski et al. 2007, Thøgersen 2006, Nolan et al. 2008, Gockeritz et al. 2010). This link is further supported by evidence I gathered from nested hierarchical modeling, which indicates that knowledge of subjects’ initial beliefs increases the explanatory power of a multivariate model of initial settings in a way that is significant, substantial, and separate from any intervening connection to outside temperatures, demographic factors, or self-reported influences to thermostat setting (Nolan et al. 2008). In addition, my analysis confirms research that suggests PNF has a durable influence on normative beliefs (Nolan 2011, Neighbors et al. 2004) and provides some evidence that a change in beliefs is correlated with a change in thermostat settings. My most holistic analysis of subjects’ response to PNF suggests that there was a tendency for subjects to decrease their settings if they had initially overestimated the citywide average and if they changed their normative beliefs in response to PNF (Fig 19). The finding that changing normative beliefs mediate the effect of PNF on behavior is consistent with studies involving collegiate binge drinking (Neighbors et al. 2004, Collins et al. 2002, Mattern and Neighbors 2004).
Fig 19. The three-factor model of normative belief generation integrated with the Theory of Changing Normative Beliefs. My results are harmonious with this model in that they demonstrate a correlation between beliefs and behavior, influence of PNF on normative beliefs, and influence of normative beliefs on behavior.

Participants

Internal Validity

The most important systematic difference between the control and treatment groups was whether subjects received PNF. Systematic differences in initial settings and beliefs between the control and treatment groups would detract very heavily from the internal validity of my study, but there were not significant differences in initial settings or beliefs between the control and treatment groups.

A systematic difference in outside temperature between control and treatment groups could also be a major confounding factor. In my multivariate models, lower temperatures—especially lower average monthly temperatures—were associated with higher initial settings. It is plausible that outdoor temperature would confound the relationship between settings and beliefs or that changes in behavior or beliefs might be misattributed to PNF when they were in
fact due to differences in outdoor temperature. This is because many people subscribe to the valve theory of thermostats, which supposes that a house will heat up faster if the thermostat is set higher (Kempton 1986). Although the valve theory is not accurate, if subjects used it as their model of how their thermostats worked, they might have increased the nighttime setting on cold nights when they wanted to minimize the time before they were warm and comfortable.

Although there were temperature differences between the control and treatment groups, they do not damage the internal validity of this study for three main reasons. First, unique contribution of beliefs to the explanatory power of the nested models suggests that the connection between normative beliefs and thermostat settings is not caused by a connection between beliefs and outdoor temperatures. Second, neither change in settings nor change in beliefs significantly correlated with change in any of the temperature variables or any combination of the temperature variables (although monthly temperature was a significant variable within the nested models). Third, there were no significant differences in average initial settings or average initial beliefs between the control and treatment groups.

The delay between initial contact and follow-up was markedly different for the control and treatment groups, but it was similar (33 days ± 4 days) within the treatment group, which is far more important. For the treatment group, longer delay times might be associated with a greater decay in belief and behavior change due to PNF. However, for the control group, delay time only matters as it relates to outdoor temperature, which I have analyzed separately.

The only significant demographic difference between the control and treatment groups was the proportion of females in each group, but gender was not a significant variable in the nested hierarchical models of initial settings.

External validity

Based on demographic factors alone, the results of this pilot study can be generalized to populations of Chicagoleans and Americans that are younger, more educated, and disproportionately Democrats. My test subjects were generally younger than the average American, which may have affected their tendency to change their normative beliefs and consequently their behavior in response to PNF, although I have no evidence to support this. My sample was also skewed toward college graduates and Democrats, who have been shown to be
more responsive to Opower (Costa and Kahn 2010). The two subjects in the treatment group who most strongly informed my qualitative analysis were Democrats, but only one was a college graduate. Overall, my subjects were also disproportionately female, but subjects in my treatment group were not.

**Evaluating the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct**

There is very little evidence that the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct effectively explains the impact of PNF on thermostat settings. I found that subjects’ average change in settings was almost significantly different ($p = 0.054$) depending on whether they received PNF and their initial setting group (below-average, average, above-average). The combination of whether subjects received PNF and their initial setting group might suggest that PNF induces conformity in the treatment group. However, there was no statistical evidence of conformity within the treatment group. The Kruscal-Wallis test shows that within the treatment group there were not statistically significant differences in the median change in behavior between any of the initial setting groups. Thus, even if one were to assume that subjects with below-average initial settings did not conform to the descriptive norm because they instead focused on an implicit, pro-environmental injunctive norm, the Kruscal-Wallis test indicates that the behavior of subjects with above-average initial settings was not significantly different from that of the average or below-average initial setting groups. In summary, categorizing subjects by their initial behavior relative to the norm does not accurately predict patterns of behavior change within the treatment group, nor is there strong statistical evidence that there are any significant differences in behavior change that are a product of both receiving PNF and initial setting group.

**Practical questions**

*Is change in setting correlated with initial setting?*

My results indicate that subjects with the highest initial settings decreased their settings the most in response to PNF, but that subjects with below-average initial settings generally did not increase their settings.
My results do not suggest that all subjects conform to the norm in proportion to their initial deviance from it; however, subjects with higher initial settings in the treatment group whose initial settings were average or above-average had a tendency to reduce their settings more. Other literature on pro-environmental social norming has offered these explanations for why individuals who conserve the least initially might conserve the most in response to PNF: regression to the mean, the relative ease of conservation given high initial consumption, and Feedback Theory (Allcott 2011, Schultz 1999). I discuss each of these potential explanations below.

Regression to the mean could explain why subjects’ settings become more moderate in proportion to their initial deviance from the norm, because my experimental design is a test/re-test of thermostat settings that have some random fluctuation (Schultz 1999). However, given all my data, it is unlikely that the conformity in proportion to initial deviance that I did observe was caused by regression to the mean. In the control group, extreme settings tended to become more extreme in a manner that was significantly different from the effect of initial setting on change in setting in the treatment group. For subjects in the treatment group with below-average initial settings, the most extreme settings did not become more moderate.

It could be that subjects with the highest settings in the treatment group tended to lower their thermostat settings the most because they could do so without being uncomfortable. One would expect that a subject who turns her thermostat down by five degrees or more would have a very high initial setting, because few people with average initial settings would be comfortable with such low final settings. For many types of pro-environmental PNF, it is plausible that subjects who have the most undesirable behavior initially will respond the most to feedback, in part because it is easiest for them to do so (Allcott 2011). For example, someone who recycles only 10% of his household waste may increase recycling rates more than someone who recycles 90% of her household waste, not because he is more motivated by PNF, but because it is easier to do so (Schultz 1999).

Finally, it has been proposed that PNF is best conceptualized as operating like any other form of feedback (Schultz 1999). According to Feedback Theory, when recipients of feedback are informed of the discrepancy between their behavior and a standard, subjects are motivated to align their behavior with the standard in proportion to the magnitude of that discrepancy so long as the standard represents a goal they feel they should achieve (Schultz 1999, Collins et al. \( \text{1999} \).
2002). It is unimportant whether the standard is the past behavior of the recipient, the goal of an authority figure, or a social norm (Jensen 1986). It is possible that subjects’ response to PNF as a function of initial setting can be explained by considering PNF as generic feedback (Schultz 1999). Even the lack of conformity from subjects with below-average initial settings can be explained if one assumes that those subjects did not find the norm motivational. Perhaps they did not perceive benefits to increasing their settings. Many subjects with low settings said their initial thermostat setting was very influenced by substantial concern with personal finances, which would suggest that for these subjects the perceived cost of conformity would be high, which tends to dampen conformity (Rimal and Real 2005, Rimal et al. 2005). Another reason that subjects with below-average initial settings might not have found the citywide average to be a motivational standard is that the PNF also provided the “efficient setting,” which conveys social approval for energy conservation in a manner similar to the explicit injunctive norms used by Opower (Schultz et al. 2007).

The relationship between change in settings and initial settings in my data could be consistent with Feedback Theory if one assumes that subjects with below-average initial settings generally did not find the standard conveyed by PNF to be motivational. Moreover, a logical advantage of Feedback Theory relative to the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct is that the standard provided by feedback is a persistent mental construct that might explain the effect of PNF on behaviors executed after normative focus has faded (Schultz 1999). However, Feedback Theory has two chief limitations. First, emphasizing PNF as feedback and not as social influence impedes program designers from considering the proximate psychological mechanisms by which normative beliefs can influence behavior. Second, this approach does not explicitly consider the difference between cases in which the normative standard reminds recipients of a pre-existing belief and those in which it changes the recipient’s normative belief; yet, to the extent that normative beliefs influence behavior, successfully changing normative beliefs is much more likely to induce behavior change (Borsari and Carey 2001).
Is there a bias to the inaccuracy of normative beliefs?

Normative beliefs about thermostat settings were often inaccurate, but there was not a bias to the inaccuracy. Subjects were not significantly more likely to overestimate the citywide average setting than to underestimate it.

Because thermostat setting is a private behavior—that is, invisible to the public eye—it is understandable that normative beliefs were not tightly clustered on the true value, because there is less opportunity for observations of others to correctly inform individuals’ beliefs. It is also unsurprising that there was not a significant bias to the inaccuracy of normative beliefs. Based on the three-factor model of normative belief formation, it is reasonable to expect that people will have a bias to the inaccuracy of their normative beliefs about a behavior only if they disproportionately observe one extreme of the behavior or disproportionately receive communication about one extreme of the behavior. For example, college students overestimate the prevalence of alcohol abuse because binge drinking is conspicuous and communication about binge drinking exceeds its true prevalence (Prentice and Miller 1993, Baer et al. 1991, Borsari and Carey 2001). Unlike binge drinking, neither high nor low thermostat settings are conspicuous or overrepresented in communications (Baer et al. 1991).

Although there was not a statistical bias to the inaccuracy of normative beliefs regarding thermostat settings, there was appreciable opportunity for reducing inflated normative beliefs. Overestimates were as high as 8 degrees, and 31% of subjects (12/39) overestimated by 2 degrees or more. To the extent that my sample is representative of broader demographics and the Theory of Changing Normative Beliefs is correct, this wide distribution of normative beliefs is promising for future PNF campaigns.

Evaluating the Theory of Changing Normative Beliefs

Are initial normative beliefs correlated with initial behavior?

Initial beliefs significantly predicted initial behavior, and the strength of the correlation ($R^2 = 0.48$) was comparable to that found in previous research on the influence of descriptive normative beliefs on home energy conservation ($R^2 = 0.45$) (Nolan et al. 2008). This finding is
also congruent with research on the false consensus effect. Research shows that university students who showered more during a water shortage estimated that their also peers showered more (Monin and Norton 2003), and homeowners with high thermostats settings are less likely to think most members of the broader population decrease their thermostat settings when not at home (van der Pligt 2006).

The relationship between initial settings and initial beliefs does not imply a uniform false consensus effect, nor do my results imply that everyone sets their thermostat to match their beliefs. All subjects with initial settings below 65 degrees thought the average setting was above their setting, and all subjects with initial settings above 73 degrees thought the average setting was below their setting. The tendency for people with extreme settings to have more moderate normative beliefs is congruent with the three-factor model of normative beliefs. For subjects with extreme settings, communication and observations about the norm are likely to be closer to the true norm than self-knowledge. The relationship between beliefs and behavior in my data suggests that beliefs are not the product of self-knowledge and random variability, but, rather, self-knowledge and constant factors that pull beliefs toward a central value closer to the true norm.

My investigation of the correlation between initial settings and initial beliefs does not yield evidence of bi-directional causal relationship between settings and beliefs, but it does not preclude it, either. My analysis shows that there is a linear relationship between subjects’ initial settings and their initial beliefs about the citywide average, but based on my analysis, without information about subjects’ response to PNF, this connection could be explained by the three-factor model, social influence, or both.

My nested linear models show that there is a relationship between beliefs and settings that is not due to confounding connections between beliefs and climatic, demographic, or motivational variables. This connection speaks to a unique mental phenomenon that explains an additional 20% of the variance in initial settings and dramatically improves the model’s statistical significance (Nolan et al. 2008). It is noteworthy that including political affiliation to the demographic variables decreases the marginal contribution of normative beliefs to variance explained by the model to 8%. This is still more than the unique explanatory power attributed to normative beliefs in previous research (6%) in which political affiliation was not one of the demographic variables (and thus its potential to confound the relationship between beliefs and
behavior was not taken into account) (Nolan et al. 2008). Backwards stepwise modeling shows that the significance and the effect size of normative beliefs are comparable to that of variables we intuitively expect to affect settings, such as concern with comfort and monthly temperature (Stern et al. 1983, Kempton 1986). The linear model has a slope of +0.50 degrees of initial normative belief for every additional degree of initial setting. That the slope of the linear model is not as steep as +1 degree of belief / degree of setting suggests that other factors, such as comfort, personal finances, and unbiased observations and communications, pull behavior and beliefs toward 68 degrees. That the slope of the linear model is markedly steeper than a flat line suggests (in conjunction with evidence from multivariate modeling) that the causal relationship between beliefs and behavior is strong.

Just as the three-factor formation of normative beliefs is not necessarily conscious (Nolan 2011), normative beliefs can strongly influence behavior yet operate unconsciously (Schultz et al. 2008, Nolan et al. 2008, Melnyk et al. 2011). An example of this disconnection can be found in a study of normative influence on household energy conservation. Researchers found that while residents thought their normative beliefs about their neighbors’ energy behavior did not strongly influence their energy use, their descriptive normative beliefs were actually more predictive of their energy use than demographic variables or beliefs about environmental, social, or personal financial effects of energy conservation (Nolan et al. 2008). Similarly, descriptive social norming spurred the greatest reductions in home energy use—exceeding the impact of alternative appeals to environmental protection, social responsibility, or personal financial benefits—but residents who received information about social norms had the lowest estimation of how much the intervention they received influenced their behavior (Nolan et al. 2008).

**Does PNF influence normative beliefs?**

Whereas the beliefs of subjects in the control group tended to remain fixed, the beliefs of subjects in the treatment group generally became more moderate in proportion to their initial deviance from the conveyed norm. For the treatment group, normative beliefs in the follow-up survey were disproportionately 65 and 68 degrees. The plurality of subjects who reported 65 degrees as their follow-up normative belief suggests that some subjects only remembered the efficient setting from the PNF even though they had to correctly enter the difference between
their setting and the average setting (68) to complete the baseline survey. In line with the three-factor model of normative belief formation, I assume that subjects who shifted their beliefs toward the norm conveyed by PNF but did not report their follow-up beliefs as exactly 68 are not misremembering the information from the PNF, but rather these subjects may have used PNF as one input to their dynamically updated beliefs, along with new observations, communications, and changes in personal behavior (Nolan 2011). A study of the effect of a one-time PNF intervention shows that PNF affected normative beliefs about residential recycling and that the subsequent decay of that effect was consistent with the three-factor model and not forgetfulness (Nolan 2011). The finding that PNF affects normative beliefs is also consistent with analysis of PNF targeting binge drinking (Collins et al. 2002, Neighbors et al. 2004), as well as social marketing targeting binge drinking (Clapp et al. 2003).

Is change in normative beliefs predictive of change in behavior?

As one might expect from the strong connection between initial beliefs and initial behavior, there is a positive correlation between change in beliefs and change in behavior. As with the correlation between initial beliefs and initial behavior, this correlation alone does not speak to whether belief change affects behavior change, vice versa, or a combination. For the control group there is no correlation between change in beliefs and change in behavior, largely because there is so little change in beliefs. To more fully understand whether PNF causes belief change, which then causes behavior change, it is necessary to analyze both the change in behavior and beliefs of each subject and the initial behavior and beliefs of each subject.

Is behavior change associated with beliefs shifting toward the conveyed norm?

Qualitative analysis of the initial and follow-up settings and beliefs of each subject added valuable insights about the missing boomerang effect, the non-uniform response of subjects with high initial settings, and the causality of the relationship between change in settings and change in beliefs.

In the treatment group, all but one of the subjects shifted their beliefs toward either the efficient setting or the average setting conveyed in PNF. Subjects with initial beliefs below 68
degrees either remained fixed in their beliefs or increased their estimation of the citywide average without a corresponding increase in settings. This suggests that the lack of a boomerang effect is not due to a lack of belief change, but to the reluctance of subjects with below-average initial settings to shift their behavior to match their increased estimation of the average. If this finding holds true for broader populations and for other private, negative-cost conservation behaviors, then PNF might productively target a wide range of such behaviors. Normative beliefs about private behaviors are likely to be inaccurate but not biased, which means that PNF can productively reduce underestimations of conservation, but it will also reduce overestimations of conservation. Fortunately, this pilot study suggests that for conservation behaviors that save residents money, changing normative beliefs do not induce a boomerang effect.

Of the three subjects with unusually high initial settings (subjects A, B, and C), the two who decreased their settings (subjects A and B) also shifted their beliefs toward the norm, whereas the one who did not change his setting (C) had unchanged beliefs. Unlike the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct and Feedback Theory, the Theory of Changing Normative Beliefs also explains why certain subjects with high-initial settings reduce their settings in response to PNF and others do not.

My qualitative analysis does not prove a causal sequence of influence whereby PNF affects beliefs and beliefs affect behavior. However, it does reveal that in the treatment group (but not the control group) most of the subjects who changed their behavior in tandem with their beliefs shifted their beliefs toward 68 and/or 65. One prominent counterexample is subject D, who significantly increased his beliefs and behavior away from the norm. In light of his increased deviance from the norm, D likely represents an example of the influence of behavior on beliefs due to the false consensus effect, rather than a data point in support of the Theory of Changing Normative Beliefs (Nolan 2011, Monin and Norton 2003, van der Pligt 2006).

Thus, my results indicate that normative beliefs conform to PNF and settings move in tandem with beliefs for subjects with high initial settings and beliefs. This offers preliminary support that descriptive-only PNF about a citywide reference group can increase overall residential conservation behavior by changing normative beliefs about those behaviors. This finding is consistent with the only other study of a descriptive-only PNF to date in which measured normative beliefs were measured, which found that the impact of descriptive-only PNF on binge drinking is mediated by changing normative beliefs (Neighbors et al. 2004). It is also
in harmony with research on a social marketing campaign targeting binge drinking that found a change in normative beliefs mediated a change in drinking behavior (Mattern and Neighbors 2004), but in contrast to an equivalent study that found social marketing affected normative beliefs but produced opposing behavioral changes (Clapp et al. 2003).

It is noteworthy that changing normative beliefs about the entire city of Chicago influenced individuals’ behavior. There is empirical evidence of correlations between normative beliefs pertaining to widespread geographical reference groups and residential energy conservation behavior (Nolan et al. 2008, van der Pligt 2006); however, many theories of social influence strongly emphasize the importance of reference groups that are socially significant, aspirational, and/or very similar to the subjects of influence, (Thøgersen 2006, Rimal and Real 2005, White et al. 2009, Abrams et al. 1990, Terry and Hogg 2000). Although descriptive normative beliefs about all Chicago residents are unlikely to directly affect behavior through proximate mechanisms that require these qualities of the reference group, it is possible that my data captures the influence of a more local reference group. Normative beliefs about local reference groups (such as friends) may “spill over” and inform normative beliefs about more global reference groups (such as Chicago residents), and vice versa (Nolan 2011). Thus, my data that demonstrates an initial correlation between beliefs and settings may not speak to a direct connection between citywide normative beliefs and settings, and my data on changing normative beliefs may capture the effect of indirectly changing subjects’ beliefs about a more local reference group.

Limitations

In addition to the limited sample size, the chief limitations of this study concern how and what variables I measured, the design of the PNF, and the target behavior.

With respect to measurement, settings were self-reported and not directly measured. There is some evidence that self-reported thermostat settings and measured indoor temperatures bear a close relationship (Vine and Barnes 1988). While it is plausible that the behavior change I recorded is inaccurate because so many people do not know how to use their programmable thermostats (Peffer et al. 2011), I can still generalize about the effect of beliefs on intentions, if not actual energy use outcomes. My analysis of the inaccuracy of normative beliefs is also
limited by my measurement technique. When I calculated how inaccurate each subject’s normative beliefs were, I used the median of his or her initial survey batch as the “true” norm. I am also limited in my conclusions by what variables I chose to measure. Because I only followed up with subjects once, I cannot comment on the decay of normative belief change or behavior change in response to the PNF. Because I did not ask subjects about their opinions on the reference group or the behavior, I also cannot comment on the specific proximate mechanisms that lead from a change in normative beliefs to a change in behavior.

The design of the PNF also limits the conclusions I can draw from this study. I included the “efficient setting” in an effort to be more faithful to Opower’s PNF, but in doing so I created a more complex PNF that has an implicit, pro-environmental frame and two sets of standards. This particularly complicates my analysis of the missing boomerang effect and of whether subjects who reported 65 degrees as their follow-up beliefs were influenced by the efficient setting, the average setting, or random variability. The context of my PNF was also unrealistic—and therefore limited in its applicability—because subjects who received PNF had to accurately report the difference between their settings and the average, and because all subjects had to generate an estimate of the citywide average, which is itself a type of normative focus. Reporting the difference between personal and average behavior requires a degree of attention to the PNF that might not occur for individuals receiving unsolicited PNF in the real world. This forced attention is particularly important because there is inconsistent evidence suggesting as to whether cognitive deliberation increases (Melnyk et al. 2011) and decreases (Kredentser et al. 2011) the power of descriptive normative influence. Additionally, the normative focus due to generating citywide estimates may play a confounding role and is not necessarily accounted for by the control group, because there may be interaction effects between normative focus and treatment (Schultz et al. 2008).

The behavior I targeted with my intervention also limits the inference of this study. Home thermostat setting has four main dimensions that make it potentially incomparable to other behaviors that might be targeted in a pro-environmental social norming campaign. First, because I restricted my treatment and control groups to subjects who paid their own utility bills, I was more likely to avoid the boomerang effect, and subjects with high initial thermostat settings had a greater incentive to conform to the norm. Negative-cost behaviors are much more easily influenced than behaviors that involve an unambiguous sacrifice (such as recycling) or an
immediate sacrifice for future benefit (such as purchasing an energy-efficient appliance or upgrading building efficiency) (Wilson and Dowlaetabadi 2007). Second, residential thermostat settings may be only partially determined by my subjects. A substantial percentage (35%) of my subjects reported that they were not always the person to change their thermostat to its nighttime setting in the week prior to my survey, and most (86%) of all my initial subjects from Chicago lived in households of two people or more. In this way, thermostat setting is like turning off lights in a home, but unlike using public transportation to commute to work. Third, thermostat setting is a private behavior, unlike taking reusable bags to the grocery store or installing solar panels on one’s roof. Private behaviors are less likely to be affected by the powerful proximate mechanism of anticipated social sanction or approval (Thøgersen 2006). But, as my research suggests, normative beliefs about private behaviors may be more inaccurate, which would provide more opportunity for informing individuals that their peers engage in more pro-environmental behavior than they had estimated. Finally, thermostat setting may be a one-time, a habitual, or an inconsistently repeated action, depending on whether individuals have programmable thermostats and how they use them. Holding other factors constant, it should be easier to persuade someone to do something once, rather than to do that thing repeatedly (Wilson and Dowlaetabadi 2007). About half (53%) of all respondents had programmable thermostats, and about half of those respondents (24% of all subjects) reported that their nighttime thermostat settings were fully automated. Among the subjects who did not fully automate their thermostat settings, there is a psychologically important difference between those who had a consistent habit of setting their thermostats and those who did not. Habits are actions that are repeatedly performed in a similar way in a consistent context until they become automatic behavioral scripts, and they introduce an important element of inertia to behavioral interventions (Oulette and Wood 1998). On the one hand, strong, pre-existing habits are resistant to intentions and personal standards for moral behavior that are in opposition to the habits (Ji and Wood 2007, Oulette and Wood 1998, Klöckner, C. A., and E. Matthies, Macey and Brown 1983). Strong, pre-existing habits are thus difficult to affect through social norming; however, the momentum of habits implies that a behavioral intervention that successfully instills a new habit will be likely to produce durable behavioral change (Wilson and Dowlaetabadi 2007). Only 16% of all my initial subjects personally adjusted their thermostats to the nighttime settings most nights of the week and at a consistent time, which means that it is unlikely that many subjects adjust their
thermostats according to a subconscious, self-perpetuating behavioral script (Oulette and Wood 1998). Most of my initial subjects (53%) and half of my subjects in the treatment group (including the two subjects who decreased their settings most in response to the PNF) said they personally adjusted their nighttime thermostat setting by hand 1 to 3 nights per week but the timing was not consistent. I did not have a sufficiently large sample size to restrict my subjects to a single behavioral type. The variation in behavior type introduces a potentially confounding factor to my study. The prominence of repeated but non-habitual behavior limits the ability to apply my findings to other behavior types, especially habitual behaviors. However, more importantly, because full automation and strong habits were infrequent, it is even more interesting that I saw behavioral changes caused by changing normative beliefs that persisted a month after PNF. This persistence without mechanical or subconscious automation suggests that changing normative beliefs through PNF can affect a stable precursor to behavior, such as intentions or personal moral standards for behavior (Oulette and Wood 1998, Wilson and Dowlatabadi 2007, Jackson 2005, Carrol et al. 2009).

**Broader Implications and Future Research**

Uncovering the dominant mechanism by which PNF affects behavior has profound implications for program design. Thus, it is important that this pilot study supports the applicability of the Theory of Changing Normative Beliefs over the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct in the context of this pro-environmental PNF. An intervention based only on the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct would be designed very differently than one that incorporates the concept of persistent normative beliefs. This is not to suggest that pro-environmental social norming explicitly or exclusively relies on the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct. In fact, some of the literature that I most heavily rely on in the present research makes passing reference to the likelihood that changing normative beliefs mediate the effect of Opower’s Home Energy Reports (Allcott 2011) and that normative focus is ill-suited to explain persistent behavior change due to PNF (Schultz 1991). By contrasting interventions rooted in normative focus to interventions that explore the possibilities of changing normative beliefs, my intention is partly to comment on normative focus. But even more, my aim is to highlight the importance of
understanding how social norming affects behavior, how context-dependent the mechanisms may be, and how social norming can be tailored in response.

A social norming campaign based on the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct logically would emphasize focusing individuals’ attention on a pro-environmental norm at the time and place that they engage in the target behavior. The Focus Theory of Normative Conduct is most applicable when there are competing norms and intervention designers want to manage individuals’ focus so that they attend to the pro-environmental norm (Cialdini et al. 1991). For example, if most people use an excessive quantity of paper towels in public restrooms, one might reduce paper towel use by using signage to focus attention on pro-environmental injunctive norms (Cialdini et al. 2006). As journalist Tina Rosenberg of the New York Times writes:

One of the most important keys to making social norming work is salience. “We can only hold one thing in consciousness at a time—and that thing drives behavior,” said Cialdini, who is writing his next book about the topic. Success is more likely if the social norming message hits people just when they are about to make that behavioral decision (2013).

On the other hand, an intervention that incorporates the Theory of Changing Normative Beliefs could easily and productively target a different range of behaviors and would be more able to optimize the effect of well-established proximate mechanisms. Although we usually do not think about our normative beliefs, they are persistent in a way that normative focus is not, and the influence of PNF on normative beliefs is similarly durable (Nolan 2011, Neighbors et al. 2004). A social norming intervention based on the Theory of Changing Normative Beliefs logically could target repeated behaviors without requiring repeated normative focus or the perpetuating effects of habit or automation. A wide range of research links normative beliefs to stable, conscious mental constructs that directly influence behavior, such as intentions to behave a certain way or personal standards of moral behavior (Jackson 2005, Wilson and Dowlatabadi 2007, Thøgersen 2006).

An intervention that emphasizes changing normative beliefs logically will be most productive if it targets a behavior for which normative beliefs are inaccurate. Inaccuracy could either be the product of public misrepresentation (as in the case of collegiate binge drinking) or the obscurity of anonymous behavior, in which case the current research offers preliminary evidence that normative beliefs may be widely distributed but unbiased. This pilot study suggests that correcting unbiased, inaccurate normative beliefs does not necessarily produce a
boomerang effect; however, if future studies show that this does not apply to positive-cost behaviors, the boomerang effect could potentially be rectified by using a competitive frame or a pro-environmental frame or by including a pro-environmental injunctive norm of a peer group (Schultz et al. 2007, Gockeritz et al. 2010).

The final advantage to the normative belief paradigm is that it is easily synthesized with research on specific proximate mechanisms that mediate the effect of normative beliefs on behavior. One of the most interesting possibilities for future research is to investigate these proximate mechanisms through survey questions and variations in PNF. This approach, which has been applied to a limited extent by researchers studying binge drinking interventions (Neighbors et al. 2004, Rimal and Real 2005), could lead to much more effective and tailored PNF, as is illustrated by the following three hypothetical examples (Table 5).

Table 5. Three very different hypothetical contexts lend themselves on theoretical grounds to three different proximate mechanisms of social influence. These proximate mechanisms suggest different optimal reference groups and framing techniques to maximize the efficacy of PNF that changes normative beliefs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behavior type</th>
<th>Reference group type</th>
<th>Proximate Mechanism / Frame of PNF</th>
<th>Reference Group Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>Self-similar</td>
<td>Perceived benefits</td>
<td>Neighbors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Socially significant</td>
<td>Social sanction or approval</td>
<td>Facebook friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral / Cooperative</td>
<td>Expansive</td>
<td>Aggregate outcome expectation and/or reciprocity</td>
<td>Americans</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First, research might test whether PNF can best affect difficult or ambiguous purchasing decisions by changing normative beliefs about self-similar reference groups through the proximate mechanism of changing perceived benefits. Research has shown that people often conform to descriptive norms for behaviors they are uncertain about in an effort to follow the most adaptive course of action, especially if they perceive that the reference group is similar to them, and that people are more likely to follow descriptive norms if they think that others are benefiting from engaging in the widespread behavior (Deutsch and Gerard 1955, Lapinski et al. 2007, Rimal and Real 2003, Rimal and Real 2005, Rimal et al. 2005, Abrams et al. 1990). By
measuring and manipulating the perceived self-similarity of the reference group and the benefits subjects associate with the pro-environmental behavior, researchers could better understand how interventions work and then design them more effectively. For the preceding example, researchers might use a proximate geographic reference group (such as neighbors) to emphasize self-similarity and frame PNF to emphasize the benefits of the behavior.

A second possibility for future research that embodies this methodology is to test whether PNF best affects publicly visible behavior by changing injunctive normative beliefs about socially significant reference groups through the proximate mechanism of anticipated social sanction or approval (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004, Abrams et al. 1990). Researchers might convey descriptive norms and subsequently measure inferred injunctive norms and also manipulate and measure anticipated social sanction or approval (Thøgersen 2006). Positive findings from such research might produce an intervention that compares individuals’ behavior to that of their Facebook friends, conveys the pro-environmental opinions of individuals’ Facebook friends, and is framed to emphasize the possibility of social elevation and/or the threat of losing social status.

A final possibility along these lines would be to test how PNF best affects environmentally conscious populations and/or behaviors that are more often thought of in terms of morality or cooperation. For such cases, a larger reference group (such as all Americans) may incite a greater sense of moral obligation, because it can affect recipients’ beliefs that their contribution would be part of a successful effort and/or that they are not doing their fair share to address a communal problem relative to the larger population (Steg and de Groot 2010, Vandenbaugh 2004, Staats and Midden 1996). By measuring and manipulating individuals’ perceptions of the reference group as well as their aggregate outcome expectations, their sense that they are contributing fairly, and their perceived moral obligation, researchers might uncover insights that would lead to a more effectively framed PNF that highlights the most commonly motivational aspects of the PNF for that context. With all three of the preceding examples, tailoring PNF will not necessarily narrow its impact, because changes in normative beliefs about one reference group have been shown to affect beliefs about other reference groups (Nolan 2011) and because multiple frames can operate at once.
Conclusion

Pro-environmental PNF can be a powerful tool for changing individual behavior, which is at the root of so many environmental problems, but to reach its potential we need to understand how it works. The Focus Theory of Normative Conduct is empirically supported for subtle cues affecting one-time behaviors, but to effectively target behaviors executed after normative focus has faded, it may be more accurate and useful to think in terms of changing normative beliefs and the proximate mechanisms by which normative beliefs affect behavior. This study suggests that for a repeated, negative-cost, private residential conservation behavior, there are inaccurate but unbiased normative beliefs about average behavior in a geographical reference group, those beliefs are significantly positively correlated with behavior, and they are persistently affected by PNF. Furthermore, my results indicate that for this behavior type, correcting inaccurate normative beliefs does not produce a boomerang effect, and subjects with above-average initial settings and beliefs change their behavior if PNF changes their normative beliefs. Future research is required to evaluate the Theory of Changing Normative Beliefs for other behaviors and populations and to understand what proximate mechanisms dominate this effect. The insights from such research could produce much more sophisticated and effective social norming interventions. This would allow for cheap, effective, uncontroversial behavior change—something that no education campaign or governmental market intervention could do.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Joe Kantenbacher, Chris Jones, and Rick Diamond inspired me to step into the world of pro-environmental behavioral psychology. Alan Meier saved me from doing a survey of Berkeley students by telling me about MTurk. Lyle Mills was endlessly patient and helpful with respect to creating my survey, and without Dahn Tamir’s cleverness and worker IDs, I would have been forced to study social norms at a national scale. Christopher Carney, Gary James Tull, Cathy Weir, Taylor Hickok, Karen Scruggs, Paz Lozano, Leyla Holt, Allie Lyn, and—above all—Avry Schellenbach, were an invaluable source of emotional support throughout this complicated, unpredictable project.

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REFERENCES


Ayres, I., Raseman, S., & Shih, A. 2009. Evidence from two large field experiments that peer comparison feedback can reduce residential energy usage. National Bureau of Economic Research paper w15386


APPENDIX A: Baseline Survey Instrument

How many thermostats are there in your household?
- None
- One
- More than one

Does anyone in your household ever adjust your thermostat setting?
- Yes
- No
- Don't know

If you wanted to, could you adjust your thermostat setting?
- Yes
- No

Which of the following best describes your household's thermostat?
- (Manual) I have to adjust the setting by hand
- (Programmable) It's possible to program my thermostat to change the setting automatically
- Don't know
The following questions refer to overnight thermostat setting: the temperature that your household’s thermostat is set to when most members of the household are asleep.

In the last week, which of the following best characterizes your overnight thermostat setting?

- It was always set by hand
- It was always controlled by an automated program
- It has an automated program, but sometimes the overnight setting was adjusted by hand
- Don’t know

Last night, was your overnight thermostat setting changed by hand?

- Yes, by me
- Yes, by someone else
- No, it wasn’t
- Don’t know

In the last week, how many nights was your overnight thermostat setting changed by hand (by anyone)?

*Please give your best estimate.*

- 0 nights
- 1 to 3 nights
- 4 to 6 nights
- 7 nights

In the last week, how many nights did you change your overnight thermostat setting by hand?

*Please give your best estimate.*

- 0 nights
- 1 to 3 nights
- 4 to 6 nights
- 7 nights

In the last week, when did your thermostat usually switch to its overnight setting?

- Over 3 hours before most members of the household were in bed
- 30 minutes to 3 hours before most members of the household were in bed
- Within 30 minutes of when most members of the household were in bed
- Over 30 minutes after most members of the household were in bed
- It was not consistent. The timing was very different from day to day
- Don’t know
What do you think the average overnight thermostat setting was for all households in Chicago in the last week?
*Please give your best estimate.*

[ ] degrees Fahrenheit

**In the last week, what was your average overnight thermostat setting?**
*Please give your best estimate.*

[ ] degrees Fahrenheit

**In the following questions, we'd like to learn about how much different factors affect your choice of overnight thermostat setting.**

**How much does concern about comfort influence your overnight thermostat setting?**
- None
- A little
- A moderate amount
- A lot

**How much does concern about being wasteful influence your overnight thermostat setting?**
- None
- A little
- A moderate amount
- A lot

**How much do environmental concerns influence your overnight thermostat setting?**
- None
- A little
- A moderate amount
- A lot

**How much do political concerns influence your overnight thermostat setting?**
- None
- A little
- A moderate amount
- A lot

**How much do personal financial concerns influence your overnight thermostat setting?**
- None
- A little
- A moderate amount
- A lot
How many people were living or staying in your household in the last week?

Do you own your residence, rent it, or occupy it without paying rent?

○ Own
○ Rent
○ Occupy without rent

Does anyone in your household pay your heating bill?

○ Yes
○ No

What is your gender?

○ Male
○ Female
○ Prefer not to answer

What is your age?

Which of the following best describes your highest achieved education level?

What is your political affiliation?

○ Republican
○ Democrat
○ Independent
○ None of the above
○ Prefer not to answer

What is the total income of your household?

In what ZIP code do you live?
### APPENDIX B: Intermediate Results of Nested Modeling

#### Outside temperature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Standardized Beta</th>
<th>t-Value</th>
<th>p-Value</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily min temp</td>
<td>0.14</td>
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<td>0.57</td>
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<td>Monthly average</td>
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#### Outside temperature + demographics

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<tr>
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<td>Homeowner</td>
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#### Outside temperature + demographics + self-reported influences

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<td><strong>0.08</strong></td>
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<td>Financial</td>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>Income</td>
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