Q&A: California-China Climate Institute

The California-China Climate Institute (CCCI) is a UC-wide initiative housed jointly at Rausser College of Natural Resources and UC Berkeley’s School of Law. Launched in September 2019 and led by former California Governor Jerry Brown, BA ’61 Classics, the Institute spurs climate action through research, training, and dialogue in California and China. As CCCI celebrates five years, Breakthroughs sat down with the Institute’s director and a student affiliate to learn about specific initiatives and the outlook for the years ahead.

These interviews have been edited for length and clarity.

Director, California-China Climate Institute

Fan Dai’s research expertise includes market mechanisms for climate change mitigation, climate diplomacy, and governance. At CCCI, she leads research on subnational climate policy and long-term planning for carbon neutrality. Dai has previously served as California’s liaison on economic and environmental initiatives with China and as senior advisor at both the California Environmental Protection Agency and the California Governor’s Office of Business and Economic Development. She was awarded the Clean Energy Champion Award by the State of California in 2024.

CCCI highlights so far?

CCCI’s strength is coordinating high-level communication between the US and China about climate change efforts. For example, in 2020 we convened an initial dialogue between Chinese Special Climate Envoy Xie Zhenhua and John Kerry even before his appointment as US Special Presidential Envoy for Climate was announced. More recently, we held a meeting of more than 340 national, state, provincial, and city leaders from across the US and China to discuss subnational climate action related to the Sunnylands Statement on Enhancing Cooperation to Address the Climate Crisis. We also played an instrumental role in Governor Gavin Newsom’s 2023 visit to China and are serving as secretariat for several of the climate-related memorandums of understanding signed or renewed during that trip. The Institute’s policy research has informed many dialogues, served as a resource for policymakers from both countries, and advanced climate diplomacy efforts globally.

What climate-related interests do the US and China share?

As the two biggest greenhouse gas emitters in the world, the US and China arguably share a responsibility to be the most important players in climate solutions. If they coordinate to deploy and scale renewables, the costs of transitioning to clean energy could be reduced. If they don’t cooperate, the entire process will be slower, and ultimately, costs will be higher for consumers everywhere. The two countries have very different agendas, and their interests sometimes conflict, but I would argue that climate change deserves to be considered separately from other issues.

What can the countries learn from one another?

In an article in Nature last December, CCCI offered numerous examples. California’s cap-and-trade program served as a blueprint for China’s local Emission Trading Scheme pilot programs many years ago. The state’s experiences with energy efficiency in buildings and with improving existing grid systems to integrate more renewables have also provided best practices for other countries. Now, the US could learn from China’s experience developing, manufacturing, and scaling offshore wind technologies. China is also very advanced in deploying electric vehicles, with nearly 50% of new car sales being EVs in many provinces.

How might changing leadership affect climate action? 

The first Trump administration taught us how to be resilient as an organization and to remain a force prioritizing climate action. We’re already seeing some measures that deprioritize climate change in this second term. Still, over the past decade we’ve seen various groups—including ones in the private sector and civil society—that continue despite federal action. One such effort is the US Climate Alliance, a bipartisan coalition of governors taking state-led climate action. Climate change is increasingly regarded as a global threat, and many of the international collaborations already happening will not stop. CCCI will continue facilitating discussions and actions to help accelerate solutions for a net zero future.

How has CCCI advanced subnational climate action?

US states and Chinese provinces are developing ambitious climate targets and implementing these policies to achieve, ultimately, carbon neutrality. They provide lessons for shifting from ideas to action and collaborating at regional scales. Our research, in collaboration with partners including government agencies, evaluates state climate targets and policies, measures progress toward climate goals, and builds tools to inform decision-making.

China uses five-year plans to orchestrate larger changes in its economy, and the country’s provincial 2021-2025 five-year plans provide a window into China’s pivot toward a lower carbon economy. Last fall, we published a policy brief examining plans released by four of China’s provincial-level municipalities, which detail actions being taken on carbon peaking and neutrality goals, environmental targets, and in sectors such as energy, transportation, industry, buildings, and natural and working lands. Our insights from the previous five-year planning period can help guide efforts as preparation for China’s 15th five-year planning cycle for 2026-2030 begins.

CCCI has also created state climate action maps that visualize subnational state and city actions codified in law across the US. We plan to expand the project to include maps of actions in Chinese provinces. We’re also launching a project to create case studies from various subnational regions to complement the maps.

How are students involved with CCCI?

Part of CCCI’s mission is to provide funding opportunities for students interested in China and climate change. Several student assistants worked on the mapping project, and through our student travel and independent fieldwork grant program, many students have advanced their independent research relating to China and/or US climate, environmental, and energy policy.

CCCI’s priorities for the future?

We’ll further institutionalize our work fostering research, dialogue, and training on subnational climate action. We’ll also expand our external partners, broadening our impact and scope to include perspectives from other jurisdictions, academia, and the private sector. For example, we’re starting a program called Pacific Climate Dialogue, which will consist of jurisdictions bordering the Pacific Ocean around the world. Many of the conversations we facilitated in the past were off the record, but we’d also like to explore making more dialogues available to the public. 

I also hope that CCCI can increase research on climate adaptation and resilience at local levels, particularly as climate disasters become more frequent and urgent. We want to look at those holistically, assessing how we can harmonize human and planetary health while planning climate adaptation and resilience.

Xi Xi

Graduate student, Energy and Resources Group

Your path to Berkeley?

After earning my undergraduate degree in math, I spent a year as an investment analyst at the Massachusetts Clean Energy Center and then worked as an EPA consultant. I returned to China to do policy work after President Xi Jinping announced the country’s goals of peaking carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality by 2060. I learned a lot about policymaking and governance through working with both governments.

The Energy and Resources Group (ERG) graduate program was attractive to me because of its interdisciplinary approach. While modeling renewable energy systems I’m also using qualitative approaches to explore which models are the most appropriate and how to interpret their results.

Why specialize in US-China collaboration in Africa?

My interest in US-China collaboration in third-party countries stems from my personal experience. I’m a Chinese citizen, but I’ve lived a third of my life in the US and feel deeply connected to both countries. In my research on energy grid expansion and industrialization in Africa, I hope to prioritize African interests while leveraging my understanding of American and Chinese interests in development in Africa.

It’s challenging to develop Africa’s utility grid without a strong industry sector, but lack of reliable power supply also hinders industrialization. It’s a chicken-and-egg dilemma, and I’m focusing on how to create strategies to develop both sectors in tandem. At the same time, equitable development is important. While I was growing up in China, the predominant development theory was to help some people get rich first, and others would follow—a trickle-down idea. Now, more people are analyzing how to balance equity with development. I’m looking at how policies can be effective and also ensure equity. I believe experiences from and collaborations with both the US and China can be valuable.

Explain your work on green hydrogen?

Green hydrogen (GH2) is an emerging renewable energy technology that’s very attractive for heavy industry and transportation. It’s difficult to use electricity to power these sectors. However, GH2 can replace oil, gas, or coal as a fuel for combustion. The hydrogen is made through electrolysis, which must use electricity from renewable sources like wind or solar power to be considered “green.” 

Hydrogen derivatives are also important in the value chain. Hydrogen molecules’ small size poses challenges in transmission and storage. Instead, GH2 can be turned into ammonia or green methanol, which is easier and safer to transport and store. Many people are also interested in using GH2 to make ammonia for fertilizer, which could significantly reduce emissions. 

Most European countries have goals to increase GH2 use but lack enough solar and wind resources to produce large quantities of it, so they are sponsoring many GH2 initiatives in Africa. I’m evaluating Kenya’s national GH2 strategy, pointing out potential technical, financial, and market risks of implementing the industry, offering mitigation strategies for those risks, and assessing potential equity impacts. 

What environmental and equity impacts might arise? 

Using electricity to create GH2 in countries where local people lack reliable power is a clear equity issue. Similarly, electrolysis requires clean water, which is already scarce in Kenya. Other distributive justice questions remain. Using Africa’s solar and wind resources to create GH2 or derivatives for export to Europe easily continues the long colonial history between the two continents.

In Kenya, downstream supply chains are planned to produce green hydrogen derivatives, which could create value for Kenyans. But we need to assess who benefits: Is it those experiencing the environmental impacts of development or big corporations and foreign-funded projects? How can we ensure just distribution of costs and benefits? Last summer, with funding from the California-China Climate Institute, I visited Kenya and China to research this topic. I’ll return this summer to share my modeling results with policymakers and prepare for further research. 

Your take on changes to US-China relations in coming years? 

Many predict that US-China relations will become more strained during the second Trump administration. This is important for Africa because there was already a lot of geopolitical tension there. Africa is a continent of massive growth potential because of its critical minerals and rich human and natural resources. It could also be a productive place for the US and China to collaborate and accelerate a rapid and just energy transition globally. The two countries’ complementary expertise, experience, and resources can assist Africa in rapid sustainable development through technological and systematic leapfrogging. 

As we face the global climate crisis, the US and China will remain players in Africa, and they can be very supportive in development processes. But a lot depends on how each country approaches the situation. There’s a Swahili proverb about two elephants fighting, and it’s the grass that gets hurt. And there’s a Chinese proverb that tells the story of a bird trying to eat a shellfish, so it puts its beak into a shell, but the shell closes, and now they’re stuck, fighting with one another. A fisherman comes in and gets them both. These are two very different metaphors that I think are relevant. When there’s a conflict and a crisis, the third party can benefit from it or be negatively impacted. The question is, will African countries be the grass or the fisherman?